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Abstract 
International trade disputes often involve the WTO as a third party that generates impartial opinions of 
potential violations when countries receive imperfect and private signals of violations.  To identify the 
role that the WTO plays in enforcing trade agreements, this paper first characterizes what countries can 
achieve alone in a repeated bilateral trade relationship in which they can secretly raise their protection 
levels through concealed trade barriers.  In particular, countries adopt “private trigger strategies (PTS)” 
under which each country triggers a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff based on its 
privately observed imperfect signals of such barriers.  This paper identifies the condition under which 
countries can restrain the use of concealed barriers based on simple PTS, where each country imposes its 
static optimal tariff in all periods under any punishment phase: The sensitivity of private signals rises in 
response to an increase in concealed protection.  Any equilibrium payoff under almost strongly 
symmetric PTS will be identical to the one under simple PTS, as long as the initial punishment is 
triggered by a static optimal tariff, justifying the paper’s focus on simple  PTS.  With countries 
maximizing their expected payoffs under the optimal PTS, they will not push down the cooperative 
protection level to its minimum attainable level, thus not setting it to the free trade level even when it is 
attainable.  To analyze a possible role of the WTO, this paper considers “third-party trigger strategies 
(TTS)” under which the WTO allows each country to initiate a punishment phase based on the WTO’s 
judgment (signals) about potential violations.  The WTO changes the nature of punishment-triggering 
signals from private into public, enabling countries to use punishment phases of any length under TTS, 
which in turn facilitates a better cooperative equilibrium.  The optimal TTS will involve an asymmetric 
and minimum punishment if the probability of a punishment phase being triggered is low enough, but it 
will entail punishments involving a permanent Nash tariff war if the probability of a punishment being 
triggered is high enough.  A numerical comparison of the optimal TTS and optimal PTS indicates that 
the contribution of the WTO is likely to be significant when the signals of potential violations are 
relatively accurate.  The WTO enables countries to adopt a more efficient punishment, such as the 
asymmetric and minimum punishment, which in turn enables countries to be less tolerant of potential 
violations and attain a higher level of cooperation as a result. 
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Enforcing international trade agreements often entails disputes in which countries present 
different opinions about potential deviations from the agreements.  Differences in opinion may 
take various forms, such as disagreement over the existence of concealed trade barriers as in 
disputes between the U.S. and Japan during 1980s, or disagreement over the legitimacy of 
antidumping duties, a frequent theme in the dispute settlement procedure of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  These disagreements reflect imperfectness of information about 
deviations from trade agreements.  In addition to being imperfect, each country’s opinion of 
potential violations can be private in the sense that the country’s true opinion is not known to 
other countries.  For example, when the United States Trade Representative (USTR) engages in 
a negotiation with China to curtail piracy and counterfeiting that impede the U.S. intellectual 
property rights, China and the USTR may not know each other’s true belief regarding the 
Chinese government’s effort level to curtail such practices, which in turn may contribute to a 
breakdown in the negotiation.
1
Trade disputes typically involve the WTO as a third party that generates impartial opinions 
of potential violations when countries receive imperfect private signals of violations.
2  To 
identify the role that the WTO plays in facilitating the enforcement of trade agreements, this 
paper first assumes away the presence of the WTO and characterizes what countries can 
achieve alone in a repeated bilateral trade relationship where each country can secretly raise its 
protection level through concealed trade barriers.  In particular, this paper explores the 
possibility that countries adopt “private trigger strategies (PTS)” under which each country 
triggers a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff based on its privately observed 
imperfect signals of such barriers.  The analysis identifies the condition under which countries 
                                                 
1 The signals that the USTR receives regarding potential deviations from trade agreements often come from the 
U.S. companies whose interests are affected by deviations.  Such signals may involve the companies’ private 
information.  Public revelation of the private information can be costly for those companies, forcing the signals to 
be private.  There exist many U.S. antidumping cases in which foreign companies under investigation decide not 
to provide costs and sales related “private” information despite the fact that such nondisclosure often leads to 
excessive dumping duties based on “best information available.”
2 When countries bring a disputed case to the WTO presenting different opinions about potential violations, the 
Dispute Settlement Procedure of the WTO encourages them to solve disputes through a consultation stage prior to 
initiating a panel stage where a third-party panel provides a ruling on the disputed case.  Countries can appeal the 
panel’s ruling to have the case examined by an Appellate Body.  Once the case has been determined by the 
Appellate Body, the losing “defendant” must comply with the ruling or face the possibility of trade sanctions by 
the complaining side. 
  1can restrain the use of concealed trade barriers based on simple PTS where each country 
imposes its static optimal tariff in all periods under any punishment phase.  The condition is 
that the sensitivity of private signals rises in response to an increase in concealed protection.  
This paper then establishes that the equilibrium payoff of any almost strongly symmetric PTS 
will be identical to the one under simple PTS, as long as the initial punishment is triggered by a 
static optimal tariff.  Given this generality result, it characterizes the optimal PTS that 
maximize symmetric countries’ expected payoffs under simple PTS.  The analysis shows that it 
is not optimal to push down the cooperative protection level to its minimum attainable level, 
thus not setting it to the free trade level even when it is attainable.    
To analyze a possible role that the WTO can play in enforcing trade agreements, this paper 
analyzes “third-party trigger strategies (TTS)” under which the WTO decides upon whether a 
violation has occurred and tells each country to initiate a punishment phase based on its 
decision as an impartial third party.  The WTO under TTS changes the nature of punishment-
triggering signals from private into public, enabling countries to employ punishment phases of 
any length, which in turn can help countries to attain a better cooperative equilibrium.  The 
comparison between the optimal TTS and optimal PTS illustrates how and to what degree that 
the WTO can help countries to enforce international trade agreements beyond what countries 
can achieve alone under PTS.  The analysis establishes that the optimal TTS will involve an 
asymmetric and minimum punishment if the probability of a punishment phase being triggered 
is low enough, but it will entail punishments involving a permanent Nash tariff war if the 
probability of a punishment being triggered is high enough.  A numerical comparison of the 
optimal  TTS and optimal PTS indicates that the contribution of the WTO is likely to be 
significant when the signals of potential violations are relatively accurate.  Under such 
circumstances, the WTO enables countries to adopt a more efficient punishment, such as the 
asymmetric and minimum punishment, which in turn enables countries to be less tolerant of 
potential violations.  As a result, a higher level of cooperation is attained compared to the 
situation without the WTO.  
This paper contributes to the literature on two levels.  First, it provides a new way of 
understanding the role that the WTO plays in enforcing international trade agreements in the 
presence of potential violations of which countries receive imperfect and private signals.   
Because the enforcement of trade agreements ultimately rely on the threat of invoking trade 
  2sanctions against violations, previous studies have also analyzed the enforcement issue using 
trigger strategies in a repeated game setup.
3  Earlier models on this issue, such as Dixit (1987), 
Bagwell and Staiger (1990), and Riezman (1991) suggest that the WTO may serve the role of 
helping countries coordinate on more efficient equilibria among multiple equilibria that 
typically arise in a repeated game setup.  To model a more explicit role of the WTO, Kovenoch 
and Thursby (1993) assume that the Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) of the WTO has an 
informational superiority (over trading countries) of distinguishing between true violations and 
mistaken perceptions, which in turn assists the workings of a reputation mechanism to support 
cooperation.
4  In a multilateral trading environment, Maggi (1999) shows that the WTO may 
facilitate cooperation enhancing third-country retaliations by disseminating information about 
deviations.
5  While these models introduce more specific roles for the WTO to play in 
coordinating a cooperative equilibrium, the literature has not resolved the question of why the 
WTO is necessary for coordination because these previous studies offer no theory of why 
countries could not coordinate a cooperative equilibrium in the no-WTO environment.
6   
This paper represents the emergence of the WTO as a change in the observation structure 
of the repeated game.  The presence of the WTO changes the nature of punishment-triggering 
signals from private into public.  This enables countries to employ punishment phases of any 
length, and as a result countries can attain a better cooperative equilibrium.  As emphasized in 
the analysis of PTS, the private nature of signals of potential violations limits the flexibility of 
punishment phases that countries can use in the absence of the WTO because they need to 
provide countries with the incentive for truthful revelation of private signals in triggering 
punishment phases.  The WTO can publicize its opinions of potential violations, which relaxes 
                                                 
3 Bagwell and Staiger (2002) provide a comprehensive review of studies analyzing international trade agreements 
as a subgame perfect equilibrium in a repeated trade relationship.    
4 Hungerford (1991) develops a model where the WTO plays a negative role in enforcing trade agreements 
because the model assumes that the DSP of the WTO involves uninformative and costly investigation.  
5 As pointed out by a referee, third-party retaliation is rarely observed, and Maggi (1999) does not model 
information transmission directly and offers no theory as to why information could not be shared in the absence of 
the WTO. 
6 Bagwell and Staiger (2005) and more recently Bagwell (2008) analyze the issue of implementing trade 
agreements when each government is privately informed about its own domestic political pressure for protection.  
Their analysis differs from this paper’s because it focuses on identifying the structure of trade agreements that can 
induce the truthful revelation of private political pressure rather than analyzing the enforcement of trade 
agreements when countries privately observe imperfect signals of potential deviations.   
  3such a constraint in developing an optimal punishment mechanism, enabling a better 
cooperative equilibrium even in the absence of any informational superiority of the WTO.
7   
The other contribution of this paper is more generally toward the literature on repeated 
games with imperfect private monitoring.  It is well known that analyzing repeated games with 
imperfect private monitoring is difficult because utilization of privately observed signals in 
determining continuation plays can destroy the recursive structure of repeated games.
8  Kandori 
and Matsushima (1998) and Compte (1998) demonstrate that communication can serve as a 
public signal that restores the recursive structure and enables players to achieve cooperation in 
such a repeated game.
9  In the absence of communication, PTS in this paper show an 
alternative way to restore a recursive structure to repeated games with imperfect private 
monitoring.
10  If players can choose explicit actions as well as concealed actions as in the case 
of governments’ choosing their protection levels, then players can avoid confusion between 
punishment phases and non-punishment phases by requiring players to signal an initiation of 
punishments by their explicit, thus public actions.
11  This can ensure a recursive structure of the 
                                                 
7 Ludema (2001) emphasizes that the DSP of the WTO may require trade agreements to be renegotiation-proof by 
promoting communication among countries prior to starting punishments.  This negatively affects cooperation by 
forcing countries to rely on weaker (renegotiation-proof) punishments.  In contrast to his analysis in a repeated 
game with perfect monitoring, an optimal trade agreement with imperfect monitoring would not typically involve 
the lowest levels of protection with the most severe credible threat because punishments do occur.  With imperfect 
private monitoring, the WTO can help countries to achieve better cooperation by enabling countries to adopt 
weaker punishments, as shown in this paper.        
8 Kandori (2002) discusses this point and recent developments in repeated games with private monitoring in detail.  
9 In these studies, the communication among players entails no cost (so that it is “cheap talk”) and each country’s 
revealed private information does not affect its own continuation payoff in order to ensure truthful revelation of 
private information.  As pointed out by a referee, however, they are unable to show what communication “does” 
though, since they were unable to show what would happen in the no-communication setting.  
10 A referee points out that communication is not illegal in the context of international trade agreements, different 
from communication in the context of price-fixing oligopolists.  It suggests the possibility of using communication 
to achieve cooperation in the absence of the WTO.  For example, one may consider applying the communication 
mechanism developed by Kandori and Matsushima (1998) to sustain international trade agreements.  There are 
two reasons why such mechanism may not work well among countries.  First, in the context of an international 
relationship, it is not easy to allege potential violations when violations do not affect the alleging country, 
especially when such allegations will negatively affect the alleged country.  In fact, the DSP of the WTO reduces 
the burden for countries of playing the third-party role of “alleging” potential wrong doings of another country by 
making the DSP to be a kind of legal procedure primarily run by experts.  Second, the use of transfers is rarely 
observed between countries, especially as compensation for potential violations of international trade agreements.  
If countries need to rely on imposition of tariffs in punishing potential deviations as they do in practice, then 
“communication” will face a similar incentive constraint as the one under PTS because “alleging your trading 
partner’s wrong doings” needs to be supported by the “action” of punishing such behavior with tariffs.
11 In the context of collusion among firms engaging in secret-price cuttings, for example, firms can employ 
advertised (thus public) sales to initiate a punishment phase against potential defections from collusive pricing.  
Similar to Green and Porter (1984), then occasional “explicit” price wars will occur as dynamic equilibrium 
behaviors to sustain collusion overtime.  Different from the model of Green and Porter where firms would always 
  4repeated game along the equilibrium path.  The analysis of PTS specifies the condition under 
which such trigger strategies can restrain the deviatory use of concealed actions.
 
The use of explicit actions to initiate punishment phases, however, does not simplify 
everything.  If each player triggers a punishment phase based on its private signals as it does 
under PTS, then in any period after a cooperative one, players need to choose their actions 
knowing only the probability of a punishment phase being triggered by other players.  Because 
an action taken by each player in a current (cooperative) period affects the probability of a 
punishment being triggered in a next period, an optimal action in the next period depends on an 
action taken in the current period, and an optimal action in a period after the next period 
depends on an action taken in the next period, and so on until a punishment phase is triggered.  
Therefore, the use of PTS necessitates a complete characterization of optimal and potentially 
deviatory action sequences that each player may take in checking incentive compatibility for 
such strategies.
12  Using a dynamic programming method, this paper establishes that countries 
can use simple  PTS in achieving cooperation as long as the private signals satisfy some 
sensitivity constraints.  With regard to the possibility of proving a folk theorem result under 
PTS, this paper generates yet another anti-folk theorem result within a class of private trigger 
strategies, namely almost strongly symmetric PTS, when private monitoring is far from being 
perfect.
13
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.1 develops a bilateral trade model where each 
country receives imperfect private signals of the other country’s use of concealed trade barriers 
and specifies simple  PTS.  Section 2.2 describes incentive constraints under simple  PTS, 
providing conditions under which those incentive constraints are satisfied.  Section 3.1 shows 
                                                                                                                                                 
start a price war concurrently, each firm may unilaterally initiate a price war phase by lowering its explicit price 
(and gains from it in that period) under such private trigger strategies and the lengths of price war phases will be 
endogenously determined.     
12 This aspect of PTS does not allow one to apply dynamic programming techniques develops by Abreu et al. 
(1986) to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs under PTS because those techniques rely on the “one-stage 
deviation principle.” For further discussion of the “one-stage deviation principle,” see footnote 21 in Section 2.2.  
13 Ely and Välimäki (2002) provide a concise discussion of why many of the strategies to prove folk theorems with 
public monitoring fail when monitoring is private and conditionally independent.  This paper also analyses the 
case where monitoring is private and conditionally independent and shows that countries cannot attain the 
symmetric efficient frontier under almost strongly symmetric PTS if the monitoring is far from perfect (Corollary 
1 to Proposition 2).  This anti-folk theorem result, however, may rely on the countries’ use of distortional 
measures like tariffs to punish potential violations.  For example, Horner and Jamison (2007) show that full 
collusion can be approximated under minimal information in private strategies where punishment phases are 
carefully designed so that no loss occurs (collectively) for colluding firms.  Such punishments are possible because 
  5that countries can support simple PTS in the repeated protection-setting game, achieving a 
certain level of cooperation.  It also establishes that the equilibrium payoff under any almost 
strongly symmetric  PTS will be identical to the payoff under simple  PTS as long as each 
country starts the initial punishment phase by imposing its static optimal tariff.  Section 3.2 
then characterizes optimal simple PTS under which countries maximize their joint expected 
discounted payoffs.  To demonstrate a role that the WTO may play in enforcing international 
trade agreements, Section 4 characterizes optimal TTS and provides a numerical comparison 
between the optimal PTS and optimal TTS.  Section 5 discusses some additional factors that 
may severely limit the use of PTS and summarizes results.  It concludes with a discussion of a 
possible extension of this paper’s analysis towards further understanding of the Dispute 
Settlement Procedure of the WTO. 
 
 
2. Private Trigger Strategies 
 
2.1. A Trade Model with Concealed Trade Barriers and Private Trigger Strategies   
The basic bilateral trade model comes from Dixit (1987) with concealed trade barriers 
being introduced in a way similar to Riezman (1991).  There exist two countries, home (H) and 
foreign (F), producing and trading two products, good 1 and good 2, under perfect competition.  
H imports good 2 and F imports good 1.  In each period each country simultaneously chooses 
its action,  , where both elements of 
i i i i A e a ∈ ≡ ) , (τ
i A   may take any non-negative real 
number.  Total import protection level and explicit tariff level are given by   and  , 
respectively, with i = 
i τ
i e
* or none.  Variables with and without superscripts * denote foreign and 
home variables, respectively.  I assume that  0 ≥ −e τ  and  , representing the 
concealed protection levels of H and F, respectively.  The local prices  ,  ,  , and   are 
related as follows:   and  .
0 ≥ −
∗ ∗ e τ





) 1 ( 2 2 τ + =
∗ p p ) 1 ( 1 1
∗ ∗ + = τ p p
14  Given the assumption of perfect 
competition, I can define each country’s one-period payoff function as a function of the terms 
                                                                                                                                                 
firms can avoid collective losses as long as any low-cost firm ends up selling its product at a monopoly price, a 
special feature that countries in a trade relationship may not replicate easily in their punishment phases.   
14 Thus, this paper does not consider the possibility of using negative or prohibitive protection.    
  6of trade, represented by  , and its own total protection level,  .  Such a payoff 
function, denoted by  , induces a corresponding import demand function,  .  
) / ( 2 1
∗ ≡ p p   π
i τ
) , (
i i w τ π ) , (
i i m τ π
  In the absence of uncertainty (no random element) in this world, each country’s amount of 
imports is a deterministic function of its own total protection level and the terms of trade.  This 
implies that each country may figure out the exact level of the other country’s protection based 
on the information about the terms of trade and the amount of imports, even in the presence of 
concealed trade barriers.  However, when I introduce uncertainty into the model as a way of 
representing shocks to technology or preferences, exact derivation of other countries’ 
protection levels based on the amount of imports and the terms of trade may become 
impossible.  Uncertainty caused by random shocks can be modeled into random components in 
the import demand functions as follows: 






t m m θ τ π =
where    denotes each country’s random components affecting its import demand at 
period t, which follow a joint density function, f(
i i
t Θ ∈ θ
t θ , ) that is iid across periods.  Subscript t 
denotes the variables determined in period t.  In equilibrium, the following balance of payment 
condition should be satisfied:  
∗
t θ
(2)   .  ) , , ( ) , , (
∗ ∗ ∗ = ⋅ t t t t t t t m m θ τ π θ τ π π
This determines the equilibrium values for  t π ,  , and   as functions of  t m
∗
t m t τ ,  , 
∗
t τ t θ , and  . 
∗
t θ
  Given that each country sets its total protection level prior to the realization of random 
shocks, each country’s one-period expected payoff, denoted by u
i, is a function of both 
countries’ total protection levels:  
 (3)    ,  () ∫∫
∗ ∗ Θ Θ ∈
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ =
) , ( ) , (
) , ( ; ), , , , ( ) , (
t t









i d d f w u
θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ τ θ θ τ τ π τ τ
where   represents each country’s one-period payoff function that is affected by 
random shocks,  , and where i ≠ j.  
) ; , (
i i i w θ τ π
i θ
This paper focuses on the analysis of symmetric equilibria of a repeated protection-setting 
game between symmetric countries.  Thus, I assume that   for all non-
negative, real values of   and  .  Regarding derivatives of   and   with 
respect to 
) , ( ) , (
2 1 2 1 τ τ τ τ
∗ = u u
1 τ
2 τ ) (
∗ τ τ, u ) ( τ τ , u
∗ ∗
τ  and  , I assume that the following standard trade-theoretic results continue to 
∗ τ
  7hold in the presence of random variables:  0 > ∂ ∂ τ u  at  0 = τ  (each country has an incentive to 
raise its protection level above zero);  0 < ∂ ∂
∗ τ u  (such protection hurts the other country); 
τ ∂ ∂u   0 < ∂ ∂ +
∗ τ u  (such protection also reduces the total payoff to H and F as it creates 
distortional losses).  For analytical simplicity, I introduce the following additional assumptions: 
0
2 2 < ∂ ∂ τ u  (the marginal gain from protection decreases as the protection level increases); 
0
2 = ∂ ∂ ∂
∗ τ τ u   (the marginal gain from protection is not affected by the other country’s 
protection level).
15  These additional assumptions guarantee the existence of a unique static 
optimal protection level for H, which I denote by h (> 0).  The one-shot protection-setting game 
between H and F then generates a Nash equilibrium where   = (h, h ) , (
∗ τ τ
*) with h = h
* by 
symmetry.    
Private monitoring is specified as follows.  At the end of period t, each country privately 
observes realized values of its payoff and own random variable,  , and both countries 















t u θ ω =
i Ω .  I assume that the probability distribution of private signal profile conditional on action 
profile has full support, that is  0 ) , , (
* >
∗
t t t t a a Pr ω ω  for  each  Ω ω ∈ t ,  , 
∗ ∗ ∈Ω ωt A at ∈  and 
.  Note that while each country cannot infer the exact level of the other country’s 
concealed protection even after observing its private signal (because it does not know the 
realized value of the other random variable), the privately observed information can serve as a 
measure for detecting the other country’s potential use of concealed protection.
∗ ∗ ∈ A at
16  M o r e  
specifically, H can choose a subset of its private signals,  Ω Ω ∈
D , so that 
> 0, with 
∗ ∂ ∈ ∂ t
D
t ω Pr τ Ω / ) ( 
) , ( ) (




t a a ω Pr ω Pr Ω Ω  denoting the probability that H’s private signal 
belongs to 
D Ω  conditional on an action profile.  For example, H can assign values of   that 
are less than a critical value as the payoff part of 
t u
D Ω .  This can induce   0  
∗ ∂ ∈ ∂ t
D
t ω Pr τ Ω / ) ( >
                                                 
15 These properties of a social utility function can be derived from a two good, partial equilibrium model of trade 
with linear demand and supply curves.  See Bond and Park (2002) for derivation of such properties. 
16 Once H observes ut, θt, and τt, for example, H can calculate the probability of τt
* ≤ l (a certain protection level) 
by Pr(τt















t d d f
t t t 0 ) , , (
) , ( τ θ θ θ






*) = ut}. 
  8because  , and the sensitivity of   against    can improve once it is properly 
controlled for 
0 / < ∂ ∂
∗
t t u τ t u
∗
t τ
t θ .  With regard to the relationship between  t ω  and  , I assume conditional 




distributed of one another.  This implies that each country cannot infer the other country’s 
private signal based on its own private signal.
17  For symmetry between H and F, I also assume 




t ω Pr ω Pr Ω Ω ∈ = ∈ ) , ( ) , (
∗ ∗ = t t t t e e τ τ
* and 
∗ = ∈ Ω Ω Ω
D . 
Given the stage game and associated private monitoring depicted as above, I can describe 
an infinitely repeated protection-setting game between H and F as follows.  A strategy for each 
country is defined by   with  
∞
= = 1 )) ( ( t
i i t s s
(4)         , 
i t j t i t i i A E A t s → × ×
− − − 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( : ) ( Ω
where 
j E denotes the set of possible explicit tariffs that each country can impose in a period 
with   and j ≠ i.    assigns each country’s current action   based on the history 
of its own previous actions,  , the history of its own private 
information,  , and the history of the other country’s explicit 
tariffs,   with j ≠ i.  If each country conforms to its strategy 
defined in (4), then the expected discounted payoff is given by: 
j j E e ∈ ) (t s







1 ) ( ) , , ( ) (
−
−
− ∈ ⋅⋅ ⋅ ≡
t i i
t
i i t i A a a a a
1
1 2 1
1 ) ( ) , , ( ) (
−
−
− ∈ ⋅⋅ ⋅ ≡
t i i
t
i i t i Ω ω ω ω ω
1
1 2 1
1 ) ( ) , , , ( ) (
−
−
− ∈ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≡
t j j
t
j j t j E e e e e
















− ) , ( ) )( , ( ) , (
*
1
1 δ τ τ , 
where  E[⋅⏐(s,  s
*)] is the expectation with respect to the probability measure on histories 
induced by the strategy profile (s, s
*), and where   ∈ [0, 1) denotes the common discount 
factor with i ≠ j.  Now, I define a supergame equilibrium in this infinitely repeated protection-
setting game as follows: 
C δ
 
                                                 
17 Matsushima (1991) analyzes repeated play of stage games with a unique static Nash equilibrium and 
conditionally independent private signals, a problem that is similar to the repeated protection-setting game of this 
paper, and shows that any pure-strategy equilibrium other than the static Nash equilibrium should involve 
conditioning on payoff-irrelevant history.  As discussed by Ely and Välimäki (2002), repeated games with 
imperfect private monitoring, especially with conditionally independent private signals, limit the use of strategies 
that are often useful for repeated games with public monitoring under which each player typically has a strict 
incentive to follow her equilibrium strategy after every history.  Private trigger strategies considered in this paper 
will be subject to similar constraints, but differ from previous works by considering the use of explicit actions, like 
tariffs, as a punishment coordination device.    
  9Definition 1.
18  A strategy profile   is a supergame equilibrium in the repeated game 
between H and F, if   and   for all   and  .  
) , (
∗ s s
) , ( ) , (
/ ∗ ∗ ≥ s s V s s V ) , ( ) , (
/ s s V s s V
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ≥ s s ≠
/ ∗ ∗ ≠ s s
/
     
To explore the possibility of supporting a cooperative protection level, denoted by l, that is 
lower than the one-shot Nash protection level (h > l) as a symmetric supergame equilibrium of 
the repeated game described above, I consider “private trigger strategies” under which each 
country uses its private signal, ω and ω
*, as a device to trigger a punishment phase against the 
other country’s potential use of concealed protections.
19  Focusing on symmetric strategies 
with  for  all   and  t  ≥ 1, I describe H’s 
strategy s (and accordingly, F’s strategy  ) as follows: 
) ( ) ( t s t s
∗ =
1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) (
− − ∗ − ∗ − ∗ − − × × = × ×
t t t t t t e a e a ω ω
∗ s
(i) Given  that  period  t − 1 was a “cooperative” period with   = (0, 0), H continues 
cooperating by setting   = (l, 0) if  , but it initiates a punishment phase by 
setting   = (h, h) if  .  
) , ( 1 1
∗
− − t t e e
) ( t t e , τ
D
t Ω ω ∉ −1
) ( t t e , τ
D
t Ω ω ∈ −1
(ii)  Given that a “punishment” phase was initiated in period t − 1 with   ≠ (0, 0), H sets  ) , ( 1 1
∗
− − t t e e
) ( e , τ = (h, h) for the following (T − 2) periods and it continues to do so one more period 
with probability λ if   and  ; H sets  0 1 > − t e 0 1 =
∗
− t e ) ( e , τ = (h, h) for the following (T
S − 2) 
periods and it continues to do so one more period with probability λ
S if   and  , 
where T and T
0 1 > − t e 0 1 >
∗
− t e
S are integer numbers that are greater than or equal to 2, and λ and λ
S belong 
to [0, 1].  H knows these variables (T, T
S, λ, λ
S) when it initiates a punishment phase.  The 
actual length of a punishment phase is determined by some public randomizing device 
(determining λ and λ
S) after the punishment phase has been initiated.     
(iii) In period 1 and other “initial” periods right after the end of any punishment phase, H sets 
) ( e , τ  = (l, 0) with probability (1 − Pr) but initiates a punishment phase by setting  = 
(h, h) with probability Pr, where Pr ≡ Pr( ) with 
) , (
i i e τ
D
t Ω ω ∈ ) , ( t t e τ = (l, 0) and  = (l, 0).   ) , (
∗ ∗
t t e τ
                                                 
18 This definition of a supergame equilibrium of a repeated game with privately observed signals of other players’ 
actions follows Matsushima (1991).  
19 One trivial supergame equilibrium strategy profile is to assign the one-shot Nash protection level for all periods 
because that would assign the static optimal behavior for each country.    
  10Note that the absence or presence of explicit tariffs classifies any period into either a 
“cooperative” period (with no explicit tariffs) or a “punishment” period (with some positive 
tariffs).  While H and F cannot observe each other’s concealed protection levels, they use their 
explicit tariffs as public signals to coordinate punishment phases as described in (i) and (ii).  
Extending a punishment phase one more period with a certain probability as specified in (ii) is 
an instrument to make the expected discounted payoff from invoking a punishment phase vary 
smoothly so that it can be set to equal the expected discounted payoff from not invoking a 
punishment phase, which is an important requirement for incentive constraints considered in 
the following section.  Also note that the actions for period 1 and other “initial” periods 
described in (iii) are designed to mimic those in a period that immediately follows a 
“cooperative” one, which in turn simplifies the analysis of the trigger strategies defined 
above.
20  Finally, note that the set of private signals that trigger a punishment phase (
D Ω ), the 
lengths of different punishment phases (T − 1 if a single country triggers and T
S − 1 if H and F 
trigger simultaneously), and the corresponding probabilities of extending the punishment 
phases (λ, λ
S) characterize the strategy profile defined by (i), (ii) and (iii), together with the 
cooperative protection level, l.  I define simple private trigger strategies as follows: 
      
Definition 2.  If (i), (ii), and (iii) describe a symmetric strategy profile (s, s
*) with  ) ( ) ( t s t s
∗ =  
for all   and t ≥ 1, then (
1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) (
− − ∗ − ∗ − ∗ − − × × = × ×
t t t t t t e a e a ω ω s, s
*) are simple private trigger 
strategies (simple PTS) with   as characterizing parameters.  ) , , , , , (
S S D T T l λ λ Ω
 
Given this definition, I can derive H’s expected discounted payoff under (s,  s
*) with 
, denoted by  ) , , , , , (
S S D T T l λ λ Ω ) (
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20 If, for example, Pr = 0 ≠ Pr(ωt∈Ω
D) with (τt, et) = (l, 0) and (τt
*
, et
*) = (l, 0), then the expected one-period 
payoffs for period 1 and other “initial” periods will be different from those for any period immediately following a 
cooperative one, making the expected discounted payoffs along the equilibrium path more complicated than those  
in (6).  Furthermore, having actions in period 1 and in other “initial” periods different from those in periods 
immediately following a cooperative period will make deviation incentives different across these periods, which in 
turn complicates characterization of the optimal protection sequence in Section 2.2.2.   
  11where  with  K = s or none.    and   
respectively represent the relative length of the punishment phase initiated by H or F alone and 
by H and F simultaneously.  Because   uniquely defines   as shown above, I 
will describe simple PTS using   instead of using   henceforth.    
1 ) )( 1 ( ) (
− − + =
K K T C K T C K K δ λ δ λ δ ) ( δ δ −
C ) (
S C δ δ −
) , , , (
S S T T λ λ ) , (
S δ δ
) , , , (
S D l δ δ Ω ) , , , , , (
S S D T T l λ λ Ω
Note that simple PTS defined above is simple in the sense that each country imposes its 
static optimal tariff in all periods under any punishment phase.  More generally, PTS may 
involve more complex punishment phases such as imposing lower tariffs if the signal indicates 
weaker violations or/and employing a stronger punishment, such as autarky, against 
presumably more severe violations.  As shown later, the equilibrium payoff of any (“almost 
strongly”) symmetric PTS will be identical to the one under simple PTS defined above, as long 
as the initial punishment is triggered by a static optimal tariff.  From now on, I abbreviate 
simple PTS to PTS unless it is necessary to distinguish them.   
 
2.2. Incentive Constraints under Private Trigger Strategies 
In this section, I analyze incentive constraints for PTS to be a supergame equilibrium in 
the repeated game defined in Section 2.1.  The private nature of signals that trigger 
punishments under PTS makes such incentive constraints different from the incentive 
constraints for trigger strategies under which public signals trigger punishments in two 
distinctive ways.  First, the private nature of signals imposes restrictions on the lengths of 
punishment phases under PTS, which contrasts with the repeated game with public information 
where countries can choose any length for their punishment phases.  Section 2.2.1 analyzes 
such limits on the lengths of punishment phases under PTS.  Second, to check the absence of 
) (
/ s s ≠  or  ) (
/ ∗ ∗ ≠ s s  such  that  ) , ( ) , (
* * / s s V s s V >  and  ) , ( ) , (
/ s s V s s V
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ > , one needs to 
check not only one-time deviations from the specified strategy, but whole deviation paths that 
each country may take.
21  If private signals trigger punishments as under PTS, any deviatory 
action that each country might have taken in a previous period can influence its optimal 
deviatory action in a current period: The previous period defection affects the probability of a 
                                                 
21 When a public signal triggers a punishment phase, any deviatory actions that each country might have taken in 
any previous periods will not affect its optimal deviatory action in the current period for a given history of public 
signals up to the current period.  This is because one country’s defections in the previous periods affect the other 
country’s current and future actions only through affecting the history of public signals.  Therefore, we can apply 
  12punishment phase being initiated in the current period, which in turn influences the current-
period optimal action.  This necessitates characterization of an optimal (potentially deviatory) 
protection sequence that each country may take against  ) , (
∗ s s   in analyzing the incentive 
constraints for PTS.  Section 2.2.2 characterizes such a sequence for H under PTS, and shows 
that H’s optimal protection sequence can be a stationary one of setting τ at l (the cooperative 
protection level) in all periods until a punishment phase starts, which is a prerequisite for PTS 
to be a supergame equilibrium.   
 
2.2.1. Constraints on Lengths of Punishment Phases  
In any period that immediately follows a cooperative period with (e, e
*) = (0, 0) and in any 
initial periods (period 1 and a period right after the end of any punishment phase), each country 
faces the choice of whether or not to initiate a punishment phase by imposing its static optimal 
tariff.  To eliminate the incentive to misrepresent private signals in such periods, the expected 
payoff from initiating a punishment phase should be identical to the expected payoff from not 
initiating it for each country.  Denote the condition that equates those expected payoffs by ICP 
for H (with the same condition applying for F by symmetry).  Then,  
ICP: 
(7)            
  ], ) ( ) , ( [ ] ) ( ) , ( )[ 1 (
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V V h l u Pr V l l u Pr
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+ − + + + − + −
= + − + + + −
where  ) , (
∗ ≡ s s V VC  and  .  The left side of the equality in (7) represents 
the expected discounted payoff from not initiating a punishment phase but continuing to set (τ,
) 1 /( ) , (
C
N h h u V δ − ≡
 
e) = (l, 0).  The right side of the equality represents the expected discounted payoff from 
initiating a punishment phase, setting (τ, e) = (h, h).  In calculating these expected discounted 
payoffs in (7), it is assumed that the other country initiates a punishment phase with a 
probability that conforms PTS, denoted by Pr. 
Using u(l, l) − u(l, h) = u(h, l) − u(h, h) implied by ∂u/∂τ∂τ
∗ = 0, I simplify (7) into 
(ICP)   .  ) )]( ( ) [( ) )( ( ) , ( ) , ( N C
S C
N C
C V V Pr V V l h u l l u − − − − = − − + − δ δ δ δ δ δ
                                                                                                                                                 
the logic of one-stage-deviation principle for the subgame perfect equilibrium with observable actions (Theorem 
4.1. and Theorem 4.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) to the perfect public equilibrium (with unobservable actions). 
  13For any given cooperative protection level (l) and any given range of private signals that trigger 
punishment phases (
D Ω ), I have two variables ( ) to be determined with one equation 
(ICP), potentially having infinite combinations of ( ) that satisfies ICP.  However, Lemma 
1 (a) below establishes that   and ICP are the necessary conditions for each 
country to truthfully represent its private signals under PTS.   
S δ δ,
S δ δ,




(a)    = [u(h, l) − u(l, l)]/(V δ δ −
C
C − VN) and   are necessary conditions for 
each country to truthfully represent its private signals under PTS, triggering a punishment 
phase iff  its private signal belongs to 
) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
D Ω .  
(b)   If H and F value their future payoffs high enough ( ) and the probability of a 
punishment phase being triggered along the equilibrium path is low enough (Pr ≈ 0), then, 
for any given combination of (l, 
1 ≈
C δ
D Ω ) with l < h, there exists a unique combination of 
( ) that satisfies the necessary condition for truthful revelation of private signals in 
Lemma 1 (a).  (See Appendix for proof.)  
S δ δ,
 
Recall that   and   respectively represent the length of a punishment phase 
that H or F can initiate alone 
δ δ −
C S C δ δ −
) , ( λ T  and the length of a punishment phase that H and F initiate 
concurrently   as   and  .  
Thus, for a given combination of (l, 
) , (
S S T λ
1 ) )( 1 ( ) (
− − + =
T C T C δ λ δ λ δ
1 ) )( 1 ( ) (
− − + =
S S T C S T C S S δ λ δ λ δ
D Ω ), ICP with   determines   = 
[u(h, l) − u(l, l)]/(V
) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C δ δ −
C
C − VN).  Note that the length of a punishment phase that each country 
initiates by itself ( ) increases in its expected gain in the initial period of the punishment 
phase by imposing its static optimal tariff unilaterally (u(h, l) − u(l, l)) but decreases in its 
expected loss in the tariff-war periods that will follow (V
δ δ −
C
C − VN).  The expected gain in the 
initial period of a punishment phase provides each country with the incentive to start a 
punishment phase despite the expected loss from engaging in a tariff war that follows under a 
punishment phase.  Thus, the larger the expected gain in the initial period, the longer a 
punishment phase that H can tolerate (without violating ICP) and the larger the expected loss 
from a tariff war, the shorter a punishment phase that H can tolerate (without violating ICP). 
  14Even when ICP is satisfied so that each country has no (strict) incentive to untruthfully 
represent its private signal after a “real” cooperative period, it may still have an incentive to 
misrepresent its private signal after a “pseudo” cooperative period under which it deviates by 
setting  l ≠ τ (or  ) with its explicit tariff being zero.  The proof for Lemma 1 (a) in the 
Appendix shows that   is indeed a necessary condition for each country not 
to misrepresent its private signals in a period following a pseudo cooperative period.  For 
example, if     so that the length of a punishment phase that H and F initiate 
concurrently is shorter than what it is supposed to be, then each country will have an incentive 
to set its protection level higher than l in a cooperative period and then initiate a punishment 
phase in the following period regardless of its private signal.  Such a deviation strategy may 
pay off because an increase in the protection level in a cooperative period raises the probability 
of a punishment phase being triggered by the other country in the foll
l ≠
∗ τ
) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
< −
S C δ δ ) ( 2 δ δ −
C
owing period, which 
would then lead to a short punishment phase (  being small) when the deviating
S C δ δ −  country 
initiates a punishment regardless of its private signals. 
 
2.2.2. Optimal Protection Sequence and Existence of a Stationary Protection Level   
To characterize the optimal protection sequence, I analyze the dynamic optimization 
problem in which H maximizes its expected discounted payoff by choosing a protection 
sequence  , given that F follows its specified strategy under PTS.  The dynamic 
optimization problem for H is  
∞
= + 0 1} { d d τ
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 with VCO = VC.  Note 
that the protection sequence   in (8) specifies protection levels only until F triggers an 
initial punishment phase.  The optimization in (8) assumes that H will follow its specified 
strategy under PTS once F triggers an initial punishment phase with V
= + 0 1} { d d τ
CO = VC ≡ ) , ( s s V
* .  The 
  15full optimization problem should characterize the optimal protection sequence after the end of 
each punishment phase that may occur in the future periods.  Characteristics of the optimal 
protection sequence derived from (8), however, will be qualitatively identical to those of the 
full optimization problem.  This is because the optimal sequence resulting from (8) will be 
identical to the one from the full optimization problem if VCO in (8) is set equal to the 
maximized expected discounted payoff of the full problem, having H face an identical 
optimization problem in determining the protection sequence after the end of each punishment 
phase in the future.
22  Also note that the optimal protection sequence considered in (8) excludes 
the possibility of using explicit tariffs as a part of its path.  As shown in Lemma 4 (b) of this 
section, however, once the lengths of punishment phases satisfy the necessary conditions for 
truthful revelation of private signals given in Lemma 1 (a), then H cannot increase its payoff by 
using explicit tariffs along its deviation path.  Hence, there is no loss of generality in analyzing 
the optimal protection sequence for H through the optimization problem defined in (8).
23  
Even though the optimization problem in (8) does not take a standard form for which a 
dynamic programming method is typically applied, Lemma 2 (a) below establishes equivalency 
between (8) and the following (non-standard) dynamic programming problem:
24
(9)   { } ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) , ( ) ( 1 1
] , 0 [
1 τ τ δ τ τ τ
τ





− − + =  for all τ−1 ∈ [0, h],  
                                                 
22 The discounted payoff of the full optimization problem can be obtained by applying the following iterative 
process to the optimization problem in (8).  Initially set VCO in (8) to be VC  defined in (6) and solve the 
optimization in (8), obtaining a discounted payoff as an outcome of this initial optimization problem.  Then, set the 
value of VCO in (8) to have the value of this initially generated discounted payoff, supposedly higher than (or equal 
to) the initial VCO (= VC), which redefines the optimization problem in (8).  This redefined optimization problem 
will generate another discounted payoff as an outcome of this second optimization problem.  Then, set VCO in (8) 
to have the value of this newly generated discounted payoff and continue this iterative process until the discounted 
payoff generated through this process reaches its limit.  As the sequence of the discounted payoffs generated 
through this process is monotonically increasing and bounded, there exists such a limit.  This limit will be equal to 
the discounted payoff of the full optimization problem. 
23 While I focus on characterizing the optimal protection sequence for H under PTS in this section, the same 
characterization can be applied to the optimal protection sequence for F.  
24 (8) is not a standard problem in the sense that the component that corresponds to the return function of a 
standard problem,  , depends not only on the current choice variable and the choice 
made in the immediate prior period (as in the case of a usual return function of a typical dynamic programming 
problem) but also on all the choices made since the initial period.  The dynamic programming problem in (9) is not 
a standard form because the current state variable, τ






− Π d d t
d
t
F Pr τ τ τ
−1, affects not only the current return function part, F(τ−1,τ), 
but also the future discounted payoff part through [1 – Pr(τ−1)].  
  16where τ−1 and τ, respectively denote a previous-period and a current-period protection level of 
H.
25  Given a solution V(⋅) to (9), the optimal policy correspondence G: [0, h] → [0, h] is 
defined by:  
(10)   G(τ−1) = {τ ∈ [0, h]: V(τ−1) = F(τ−1, τ) + δ
C[1 – Pr(τ−1)]⋅V(τ)}, 
which contains values of τ  that maximize V(τ−1) for each τ−1 ∈ [0, h].  Despite the fact that the 
dynamic optimization problem in (8) and the corresponding dynamic programming problem in 
(9) take non-standard forms, Lemma 2 establishes the following standard results on V and G:  
 
Lemma 2.   
(a) Define  ) ( 0 τ S V be the supremum function that is generated by (8).  Then, (i)   satisfies 
(9); (ii) the solution to (9) is 
S V
) ( ) ( 1 1 − − = τ τ S V V ; (iii) every optimal protection sequence 
solving (8) is generated from G in (10); (iv) any protection sequence generated by G in 
(10) is an optimal protection sequence that solves (8).  
(b)  There exists a unique continuous function V that satisfies (9). 
(c)  The optimal policy correspondence G defined by (10) is compact-valued and upper hemi-
continuous. (See Appendix for Proof) 
 
Given Lemma 2, I can characterize the optimal protection sequence of H by characterizing 
G(⋅) in (10) because any protection sequence generated by G with the initial τ−1 being set at l is 
an optimal protection sequence that solves (8).  Utilizing one of the generalized envelope 
theorems of Milgrom and Segal (2002) and a general result on the differentiability of the value 
function of Cotter and Park (2006), I can characterize V and G as follows:
 26   
 
Lemma 3. Assume that the lengths of punishment phases satisfy the conditions in Lemma 1 (a).  
                                                 
25 Note that limiting H’s protection choice to be equal or less than h as in (9) does not affect the generality of the 
optimization problem because H has no incentive to raise its protection level above its static optimal protection 
level, h.  
26 In characterizing V and G, I cannot use the well-known result of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) on the 
differentiability of the value function.  While Benveniste and Scheinkman established that concavity of the return 
function on the state and choice variables is sufficient to guarantee the differentiability of the resulting value 
function of a typical dynamic programming problem, the dynamic problem of choosing an optimal protection 
sequence analyzed in this paper does not belong to the typical dynamic programming problem, as explained earlier.  
Recently, Milgrom and Segal (2002) developed generalized envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets, and 
Cotter and Park (2006) established differentiability of the value function on the range of the optimal policy 
correspondence, regardless of the curvature of the return function.  I apply these results in characterizing V and G, 
as shown in the proof of Lemma 3.    
  17(a)  V(τ−1) is strictly decreasing in τ−1 ∈ [0, h]. 
(b)  G(τ−1) is strictly increasing in τ−1 in the sense that g( ) > g( ) for all   >   ∈ [0, h] 


















Because a higher τ−1 (a higher protection level in the cooperative previous period) implies a 
higher probability that F triggers a punishment phase in the current period, a higher τ−1 also 
implies a more hostile environment for H to maximize its discounted payoff.  Therefore, the 
outcome of the maximization problem, V(τ−1), will get smaller as τ−1 increases (Lemma 3 (a)).  
To understand Lemma 3 (b), first note that choosing τ (a current-period protection level) 
must balance the current period’s loss from setting the protection level below h (the static 
optimal one) against the future periods’ gain from reducing the probability of a punishment 
phase being triggered.  Figure 1 demonstrates this.  Given the pervious-period protection level 
τ−1 is equal to  , setting τ = h maximizes  
  because it maximizes the expected current period payoff, 
 and τ does not affect the future expected discounted payoff 
contingent upon a punishment phase being initiated in the current period,    
By reducing τ below h, however, H can increase its expected discounted payoff,   
 because V(τ) strictly decreases in τ by Lemma 3 (a).  As shown in Figure 1, 
if H lowers τ from h,   strictly increases.  Therefore, g( ), the optimal 
current-period protection with   being the previous-period protection level, is lower than h.      
/
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Given this understanding of the optimal choice over τ, I can explain why G(τ−1) strictly 
increases in τ−1 using Figure 1.  When τ−1 increases from   to  , it may shift   
upwards as shown in Figure 1 but it will not affect   =  , implying 
that the static incentive to raise τ closer to h stays the same; for example, 
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1 − − − − − − − = − τ τ τ τ τ τ g F h F g F h F −1, however, 
weakens the dynamic incentive for lowering τ to avoid a punishment phase in a future period 
because it increases the likelihood of a punishment phase starting in the current period.  Figure 
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1 − τ −1 moves the balance for choosing an optimal τ  towards a 





The fact that G(τ−1) is strictly increasing in τ−1 may entail both an increasing protection 
sequence and a decreasing one as shown in Figure 2; if  , then the optimal protection 
sequence will be increasing with  ; and if  , then the optimal protection 
sequence will be decreasing with  .
/
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27  I f   S τ τ = 0 , however, the resulting 
optimal protection sequence will be stationary with  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = = = 2 1 0 τ τ τ .  If there exists such a 
stationary protection level, τS ∈ [0, h) under PTS with G(τS) = τS and l = τS, then H would 
continue to set its protection level at l until a punishment phase begins.  Therefore, the 
existence of such a stationary protection level, τS, is a prerequisite for PTS to be a supergame 
equilibrium of the repeated game.  An increasing optimal policy correspondence (Lemma 3 (b)) 
itself, however, does not rule out the possibility that the only stationary protection level of the 
dynamic problem in (9) is h, as demonstrated by G
/(τ−1) in Figure 2.   
To address the existence issue of a stationary protection level τS ∈ [0, h) with G(τS) = τS, I 
analyze a necessary condition for such τS.  If V(τ) is differentiable with respect to τ, then τS 
should satisfy the following first order condition for a stationary equilibrium, denoted by IC: 
(11)  IC:   ∂F(τS, τS)/∂τ  + δ
C[1 − Pr(τS)]⋅[∂V(τS)/∂τ] = 0, 
where ∂F(τS, τS)/∂τ = ∂u(τS, l)/∂τ and ∂V(τS)/∂τ = –[∂Pr(τS)/∂τ ]{u(τS, l) + δ
CV(τS) – [u(τS, h) + 
(δ
C – δ)VN  + δVC]}.  While I cannot assume differentiability of V(τ) on τ ∈ [0, h] as explained 
earlier, V(τ) is differentiable on any τ ∈ G(τ−1) and τ ∈ (0, h) for each τ−1∈ [0, h], according to 
a generalized differentiability result of Cotter and Park (2006).  Therefore, (11) is indeed a 
necessary condition for any stationary protection level that belongs to (0, h).  Thus it serves as 
an incentive constraint (IC) for H to sustain the cooperative protection level, l = τS under PTS.         
                                                 
27 If the cooperative protection level is set too low under PTS with l = τ0
/, then H would keep raising the protection 
level above the cooperative one until it reaches a stationary level, τS, and the opposite is true if the cooperative 
protection level is too high with l = τ0
//.  Blonigan and Park (2004) identify that a similar dynamic behavior 
emerges in the context of an exporting firm’s dynamic pricing problem in the presence of antidumping policy; 
once an exporting firm becomes subject to an antidumping duty, it would either continue to decrease its export 
price (thus, having the duty increase over time) or continue to increase its export price (thus, having the duty 
lowered over time) depending on whether the initial export pricing is higher or lower than a stationary pricing. 
  19For τS to be a stationary protection level for H, the static incentive to raise the protection 
level, ∂F(τS, τS)/∂τ > 0 in (11), needs be balanced by the dynamic incentive to avoid a costly 
punishment phase in the future, δ
C[1 − Pr(τS)]⋅[∂V(τS)/∂τ] < 0 in (11).  Lemma 4 (a) below 
provides a sufficient condition for the existence of such τS ∈ (0, h) with G(τS) = τS, and Lemma 
4 (b) shows that H does not have any incentive to utilize explicit tariffs as part of its deviation 
path if l = τS.  
 
Lemma 4. Assume that the lengths of punishment phases satisfy the conditions in Lemma 1 (a). 
(a) If  ∂
2Pr(τ)/(∂τ)
2 > 0 with [∂
2Pr(τ)/(∂τ)
2][1 – Pr(τ)] – {1 + δ
C[1 – Pr(τ)]}[∂Pr(τ)/∂τ ]
2 > 0 
for all τ  ∈ [0, h] and ∂Pr(τ)/∂τ  ≈ 0 at τ = 0, then there exists a unique stationary 
equilibrium protection level τS  ∈ (0, h) with G(τS) = τS.  τS is also a globally stable 
equilibrium with G(τ) > τ  for τ ∈ [0, τS)  and G(τ) < τ  for τ ∈ (τS, h).
28       
(b)  If  l = τS, then H cannot increase its discounted payoff above  ) , (
* s s V   by taking any 
(deviatory) protection sequence that involves initiating punishment phases by imposing 
explicit tariffs.  (See Appendix for Proof) 
 
 According  to  Lemma 4 (a), it is possible to have IC in (11) satisfied for some τS < h if the 
sensitivity of F’s private information in detecting a rise in H’s concealed protection, ∂Pr(τS)/∂τ, 
increases as H’s concealed protection level rises with ∂
2Pr(τ)/(∂τ)
2 > 0.  On the one hand, H’s 
static incentive to raise its protection level, ∂F(τS, τS)/∂τ  = ∂u(τS, l)/∂τ in (11), diminishes as τS 
increases with ∂
2u(τS, l)/∂τ
2 < 0, reaching zero atτS = h.  On the other hand, H’s dynamic 
incentive to avoid a future punishment phase, δ
C[1 − Pr(τS)]⋅[∂V(τS)/∂τ] in (11), may diminish 
or intensify in response to an increase in τS, depending on the value that ∂
2Pr(τS)/∂τ
2 takes.  A 
higher τS reduces H’s weight on its dynamic incentive to avoid a punishment phase, 1 − Pr(τS), 
by increasing the probability of a punishment phase being triggered in the current period.  If 
∂
2Pr(τS)/∂τ
2 > 0, an enhanced sensitivity of F’s private information in detecting a rise in H’s 
protection can offset such a reduction in H’s incentive to avoid a punishment phase.  The 
absolute value of δ
C[1 − Pr(τS)]⋅[∂V(τS)/∂τ] rises in response to a rise in τS if [∂
2Pr(τ)/(∂τ)
2][1 – 
                                                 
28 τS being a globally stable protection level is a contributing factor to the stability of PTS as an equilibrium of the 
repeated game.  This is because H will eventually return to its globally stable behavior of setting τ  = τS (= l) after 
any arbitrary perturbations (possibly caused by errors) in its protection level choices.  
  20Pr(τ)] – {1 + δ
C[1 – Pr(τ)]}[∂Pr(τ)/∂τ ]
2 > 0 for all τ ∈ [0, h], as assumed in Lemma 4 (a).  
This in turn guarantees the existence of a unique τS ∈ (0, h) that satisfies IC in (11) with 
∂Pr(τ)/∂τ ≈ 0 at τ = 0.  
  Having the sensitivity of private information rise against increasing concealed protection 
can be crucial in discouraging the use of concealed protection under PTS.  If ∂
2Pr(τ)/(∂τ)
2 = 0, 
for example, the dynamic incentive for lowering τ below h to avoid a tariff war in a future 
punishment phase, δ
C[1 − Pr(τS)]⋅[∂V(τS)/∂τ] in (11), decreases as τS gets higher, entailing the 
possibility of IC in (11) not being satisfied for any τS < h.
 
While  Lemma  4 specifies the condition under which H (and F) would follow PTS by 
keeping its protection at a cooperative level until a punishment phase is triggered, note that 
Lemma 4 “assumes” that the lengths of punishment phases satisfy the conditions in Lemma 1 
(a).  Because such lengths of punishment phases “vary” with the cooperative protection level to 
sustain under PTS, it still remains to be shown whether there exist PTS that satisfy the 
conditions in Lemma 1 ( a) and IC simultaneously.  The following section provides an 
affirmative answer.  
 
 
3. Optimal Private Trigger Strategies  
 
This section establishes that symmetric countries can sustain a symmetric cooperative 
protection level under simple PTS defined in the previous section if the sensitivity of their 
private information satisfies certain conditions.  In addition, this section proves that any 
equilibrium payoff under (“almost strongly”) symmetric trigger strategies that start an initial 
punishment phase by imposition of a static optimal tariff based on each country’s imperfect 
private  signal should be identical to the payoff under simple  PTS.
  29  After proving the 
existence and the uniqueness (in terms of payoffs, at least among a certain class of trigger 
strategies) of symmetric PTS as a supergame equilibrium in Section 3.1, I characterize optimal 
symmetric PTS under which H and F maximize their joint expected discounted payoffs in 
Section 3.2. 
   
3.1. Private Trigger Strategies and Uniqueness Results  
  21This section first proves the existence of simple PTS that satisfy the conditions in Lemma 1 
(a) and IC simultaneously.  Assume that there exists τS that satisfies IC in (11) with τS = l.  This 
implies that V(τS) = VC, and I can rewrite IC in (11) as follows: 
(12)   ∂u(τS, l)/∂τ  = δ
C[∂Pr(τS)/∂τ ][1 − Pr(τS)][u(τS, l) – u(τS, h) + (δ
C – δ )(VC – VN)]. 
As discussed in the previous section, (12) is a necessary condition for H to have no incentive to 
change its protection level away from the cooperative one until a punishment phase starts.  I 
also assume that the lengths of punishment phases are determined by the conditions in Lemma 
1 (a);   = [u(h, l) − u(l, l)]/(V δ δ −
C
C − VN) and .  IC in (12) then can be 
rewritten into the following implicit function, I(l):   
) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
(13)  I(l) ≡ ∂u(l, l)/∂τ  − δ
C[∂Pr(l)/∂τ ][1 − Pr(l)][u(h, l) – u(l, h)] = 0, 
by substituting   with [u(h, l) − u(l, l)]/(V δ δ −
C
C − VN).  Using I(l), Proposition 1 provides a 
sufficient condition for the existence of simple PTS that countries can sustain as a supergame 
equilibrium of their repeated protection-setting game: 
 
Proposition 1. If ∂
2Pr(l)/(∂l)
2 > 0 with [∂
2Pr(l)/(∂l)
2][1 – Pr(l)] – {1 + δ
C[1 – Pr(l)]}[∂Pr(l)/∂l]
2 
> 0 for all l ∈ [0, h], ∂Pr(l)/∂l ≈ 0 at l = 0, and there exists at least one protection level,   < h S l  
such that I( ) = 0, then, H and F can employ simple PTS with l =  ,   = [u(h,  ) − 
u( , )]/(V
S l S l δ δ −
C
S l
S l S l C  −  VN), and    as a supergame equilibrium of the repeated 
protection-setting game.  (See Appendix for Proof) 
) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
 
Proposition 1 assumes the same condition regarding the sensitivity of private information 
as the one in Lemma 4 (a), ensuring that there exists a unique stationary equilibrium protection 
level τS ∈ (0, h) with G(τS) = τS.  In addition, it requires I(l) = 0 for at least one value of l < h, 
denoting it by  .  With l =  ,   = [u(h,  ) − u( , )]/(V S l S l δ δ −
C
S l S l S l C − VN) and   
, I( ) = 0 guarantees that IC and the conditions in Lemma 1 (a) are simultaneously 
satisfied under such PTS.  According to Lemma 4,    is the unique stationary protection level 
with G( ) =   and countries have no incentive to deviate from such PTS.     
= −
S C δ δ




S l S l
                                                                                                                                                 
29 Definition 3 below provides a formal definition of “almost strongly symmetric private trigger strategies.”  
  22The sufficient condition in Lemma 4 (a) does not necessarily imply that the second term of 
I(l) in (13), δ
C[∂Pr(l)/∂τ ][1 − Pr(l)][u(h, l) – u(l, h)], representing H’s dynamic incentive to 
avoid a tariff war, increases in response to a rise in l.
30  Thus, one may consider the case where 
multiple values of l satisfy I(l) = 0 as illustrated in Figure 3; l = lmax as well as l = lmin satisfy I(l) 
= 0.  Denoting the minimum of such l by lmin, then simple PTS with l = lmin will Pareto-
dominate the others when Pr(l) is small enough.
31
While the above result establishes that symmetric countries may employ simple PTS 
characterized by Proposition 1 (and Definition 2) in restraining the use of concealed trade 
barriers, one may wonder whether there exist other (symmetric) private trigger strategies that 
may outperform this simple one.  Surprisingly, the following result shows that there is no loss 
of generality in focusing on this simple PTS to characterize the optimal symmetric private 
trigger strategies as long as the explicit tariff that starts an initial punishment phase is the static 
optimal tariff of each country.  The first part of the following result applies to a larger class of 
trigger strategies: any symmetric private trigger strategies where each country can start an 
initial punishment phase with an explicit tariff of any level. 
Denote the level of τ (total protection) that initiates the first (or initial) punishment phase 
with e (explicit tariff) > 0 by d0 and the cooperative protection level for the initial cooperative 
periods (prior to any punishment being triggered) by l0, thus focusing on the symmetric private 
trigger strategies where the cooperative protection level and the protection level that starts an 
initial punishment phase are stationary at least prior to an initial punishment phase.
  Then, I can 
represent the expected discounted payoff of H of employing such symmetric private trigger 
strategies as follows, denoting it by V(l0; d0): 
(14)   
], ) , ( [ ] ) , ( )[ 1 (                 













V d d u Pr V l d u Pr Pr
V d l u Pr Pr V l l u Pr Pr d l V
δ δ
δ δ
+ + + − +
+ − + + − − = ∗
where Pr ≡ Pr(l0) = Pr(ω ∈
D Ω ) given (τ, e) = (l0, 0) and (τ
*
, e
*) = (l0, 0), and VC ≡ V(l0; d0).  
,   and   denote the expected discounted payoff of H after an initial punishment phase 
has been by triggered, respectively by H alone, by F alone, and by H and F simultaneously in a 
D V ∗ D V S D V
                                                 
30 For the proof of this claim, see the proof for Proposition 1 in Appendix. 
31 Note that u(lmin, lmin) > u(lmax, lmax) and Pr(lmin) < Pr(lmax) imply a higher cooperative-period payoff and a lower 
probability of punishment phases with l = lmin than with l = lmax.  While the lengths of punishment phases may be 
longer with l = lmin than with l = lmax, an increase in l will lower the expected discounted payoff under simple PTS 
if Pr(l) is close enough to 0, as shown in (18) of the following section.   
  23previous period.  Given these notations, the following definition defines “almost strongly 
symmetric PTS”: 
 
Definition 3. Among the set of symmetric strategies with   for  all 
   and t ≥ 1, almost strongly symmetric PTS with (l
) ( ) ( t s t s
∗ =
= × ×
− ∗ − − 1 1 1 ) (
t t t e a ω
1 1 1 ) ( ) (
− − ∗ − ∗ × ×
t t t e a ω 0; 
d0) are private trigger strategies under which each country starts its initial punishment phase by 
imposing an explicit tariff (e > 0) with its τ = d0, and the initial cooperative protection level is 
l0 with   =  . D V ∗ D V  
 
It is “almost strongly symmetric” strategies rather than “strongly symmetric” strategies 
under which   for  all  t  ≥ 1 because    may occur when   or 
, and   =    does not necessarily entail    after such contingencies.   
The payoff function in (14) implicitly assumes that each country sets its initial cooperative 
explicit tariff to be zero.  Relaxing this assumption by allowing e > 0 in the initial cooperative 
periods would not raise the payoff in (14) as long as the sensitivity of private information of 
concealed trade barriers improves with a higher level of concealed trade barriers.
) ( ) ( t s t s
∗ = ) ( ) ( t s t s
∗ ≠
D
t Ω ω ∈ −1
D
t Ω ω ∈
∗
−1 D V ∗ D V ) ( ) ( t s t s
∗ =
32  F o r  
simplicity, I will abbreviate almost strongly symmetric PTS by symmetric PTS henceforward.  
For symmetric PTS defined by Definition 3 to be incentive-compatible (so that they can be 
supported as equilibrium behaviors), the following analysis establishes that the payoff in (14) 























0 0 . 
Note that the payoff in (15) depends only on the values of l0 and d0.  Once established, the 
above result remarkably simplifies the job of characterizing the payoff frontier attainable under 
any symmetric PTS that rely on triggering a punishment phase with some explicit tariffs: one 
only needs to find l0 and d0 that are incentive-compatible, which in turn maximize the payoff in 
(15).  
                                                 
32 e  = e 
* = 0 forces each country to raise its protection level all through concealed trade barriers.  If the sensitivity 
of private information improves with a higher level of such barriers, the effectiveness of private trigger strategies 
against the incentive to raise protection levels should improve with such constraints of setting e  = e 
* = 0 in the 
(initial) cooperative periods. 
  24To prove (15), I use three incentive-compatibility conditions: (i) a generalized version of 
ICP, (ii) IC for setting the initial cooperative protection level to be l0 and continuing to set τ = 
l0 in the following period upon the contingency of no punishment phase being initiated, and (iii) 
IC for setting the initial cooperative protection level to be l0 and starting an initial punishment 
phase by setting τ = d0 in the following period upon the contingency of no punishment phase 
being initiated.  First, note that any symmetric PTS triggering the initial punishment phase 
withτ  = d0 and e > 0 should satisfy the following ICP
G: 
(ICP
G)   
], ) , ( [ ] ) , ( )[ 1 (
] ) , ( [ ] ) , ( )[ 1 (
0 0 0 0









V d d u Pr V l d u Pr
V d l u Pr V l l u Pr
δ δ
δ δ
+ + + − =
+ + + −
∗
∗
which equalizes the payoff of initiating the (initial) punishment phase with the payoff of not 
initiating it, similarly to ICP in the previous section.  Using u(l0, l0) − u(l0, d0) = u(d0, l0) − u(d0, 
d0) implied by ∂
2u/∂τ∂τ
* = 0, I can simplify (ICP
G) as follows: 
(ICP
G)     .  )] ( ) ( ) [( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 0 0 S D C D C D C
C
D C
C V V V V V V Pr V V l d u l l u − − − + − = − + − ∗ ∗ δ δ
To identify incentive constraints for setting the initial cooperative protection level to be l0, I 
can write the expected discounted payoff of H setting τ to be  I τ in an initial period (prior to any 
punishment phase being triggered) as 
   
]}, ) , ( )][ ( 1 [ ] ) , ( )[ ( ) , ( ){ 1 (
] ) , ( [
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     or 
   
depending on whether H sets τ = l
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+
0 or τ = d0, respectively, in the following period upon the 
contingency of no punishment phase being initiated after setting τ =  I τ   as the initial 
cooperative protection level.  To be able to support  I τ  = l0 as an equilibrium behavior, the 
following IC
G need to be satisfied:   
(IC
G) 
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  25implying that     Using 
this last equality together with the simplified ICP
). ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S D D
C
D C
C V V d d u l d u V V l d u l l u − + − = − + − ∗ δ δ
P
G and  ∗ =
D D V V , one can show that 
, 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = − − − + − ∗ S D C D C D C V V V V V V  thus     Given these 
equalities, one can rewrite V(l ; d ) in (14) into the one in (15) using the following steps: 
). ( ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 0 0 D C
C V V l l u l d u − = − δ
0 0
 (16)     
)], , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( [ ) (                 
)] ( ) ( ) [(                    
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where the second line through the forth in (16) all take zero values and the last line in (16) 
generates (15) using  .  I can summarize this result in the following proposition:   C V d l V = ) ; ( 0 0
 
Proposition 2.  The equilibrium payoff of any symmetric PTS (defined by Definition 3) with the 
initial cooperative protection level being l0 and the level of total protection that starts the initial 






















0 0 , 
where Pr(l0) = Pr( ∈
∗
t ω




t e ) = (l0, 0). 
 
The above proposition establishes that one can fully characterize the equilibrium payoff of 
any symmetric PTS only with the information about l0 and d0 that are incentive-compatible.  
Given  , the necessary condition for an incentive-compatible 
choice of l
) ( ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 0 0 D C
C V V l l u l d u − = − δ
0 is  
(IC
G)   )] , ( ) , ( [
) (
)] ( 1 [
) , (

















This condition is identical to IC for simple PTS characterized in (13) if d0 = h, the static optimal 
protection level.  IC
G and Proposition 2 together imply that countries cannot attain the 
symmetric efficient frontier where VC = u(l , l )/(1 − δ ) 0 0
C  with l0 = 0 as their equilibrium payoffs 
under any symmetric PTS if their private signals entail non-negligible errors in detecting the use 
of concealed trade barriers.  If l0 = 0, then  0 / ) , ( 0 0 > ∂ ∂ τ l l u , which in turn requires 
  26) , ( ) , ( 0 0 0 0 d l u l d u −  > 0 to satisfy IC
G.  Given that Pr(l0) > 0 due to non-negligible errors in the 
private information, Proposition 2 implies that   
 with l
− = − − ) , ( )[ ( ) ; ( ) 1 /( ) , ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 l d u l Pr d l V l l u
C δ
0 ) 1 /( )] , ( 0 0 > −
C d l u δ 0 = 0.  The following corollary to Proposition 2 states this finding: 
 
Corollary 1 to Proposition 2.  Under any symmetric PTS, countries cannot attain the symmetric 
efficient frontier where VC = u(l , l )/(1 − δ ) 0 0
C  with l0 = 0 as their equilibrium payoffs if their 
private signals entail non-negligible errors in detecting concealed trade barriers with Pr(l0) > 0. 
 
This  anti-folk theorem result under symmetric PTS demonstrates an aspect of private 
trigger strategies considered in this paper: To have each country properly trigger a punishment 
phase under which it may gain in the initial punishment period, such a punishment-initiating 
country needs to be penalized later in the punishment phase, a costly process for all countries 
involved.  Also note that this anti-folk theorem result is attained under symmetric PTS, a subset 
of private trigger strategies that countries can employ, thus it is still an open question whether 
one can obtain a folk theorem result under a more general private trigger strategies.  
Beyond proving the above anti-folk theorem result under symmetric PTS, a further 
characterization of symmetric PTS is not a simple matter.  While Proposition 1 guarantees the 
existence of incentive-compatible symmetric PTS with d0 = h = e, characterizing the necessary 
condition for an incentive compatible choice of d0 ≠ h is far from being an easy task.  Once d0 ≠ 
h, each country would have an incentive to start an initial punishment phase by choosing τ ≠ d0 
such as τ = h, necessitating a punishment scheme against such a deviation incentive.  Note that 
the punishment scheme against a deviatory initiation of an initial punishment phase generates 
yet another private monitoring problem, which can be different from the one for the initial 
periods.  This process of having an additional and different private monitoring issue against 
deviatory uses of punishment phases may continue forever, making a general characterization 
of it a very difficult task.
33  
                                                 
33 If PTS are strongly symmetric with s(t) = s
*(t) for all t ≥ 1, except for unilateral initiations of punishment phases 
against potential violations, and if PTS do not allow each country to start another (new) punishment phase right 
after its initiation of an initial punishment phase, then one can show that the only incentive compatible choice of d0 
is h.  This is possibly another way of justifying the paper’s focus on simple PTS, but this approach seems to 
impose rather stringent constraints on PTS. 
  27Even when one ignores the issue of finding an incentive-compatible d0 and pretends that 
one can choose any value for d0, it is not clear whether choosing d0 < h would increase the 
expected discounted payoff in comparison with the choice of setting d0 = h.  For example, 
setting d0 < h would raise V(l0; d0) by decreasing u(d0, l0) – u(l0, d0) with ∂[u(d0, l0) – u(l0, 
d0)]/∂d0 > 0.  However, lowering d0 weakens the IC
G by lowering the right hand side value of 
IC
G shown above, thus decreasing V(l0; d0) by raising the value for l0.  The optimality of 
choosing  d0 ≠ h, even when it is incentive-compatible, therefore, depends on the trade-off 
between its direct effect on the payoff through changing u(d0, l0) – u(l0, d0) and its indirect 
effect through changing the incentive-compatible l0, which in turn requires further 
characterization of the private information of concealed trade barriers.  
In the following characterization of the optimal symmetric PTS, I will focus on the optimal 
symmetric PTS with d0 = h.  Note that this constraint of setting d0 = h still allows full flexibility 
over the choice of strategies that each government can take once an initial punishment phase 
starts.  With regard to the issue of characterizing the efficient frontier among this subset of 
symmetric PTS with d0 = h, one can focus on simple PTS characterized in Proposition 1 as the 
following corollary clarifies. 
 
Corollary 2 to Proposition 2.  The equilibrium payoff of any symmetric PTS (defined by 
Definition 3) with the initial cooperative protection level being l and the level of total 
protection that starts the initial punishment phase being h, is identical to the payoff of simple 
PTS characterized in Proposition 1 with  
C C
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where Pr(l) = Pr( ∈
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t ω




t e ) = (l, 0).
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3.2 Optimal Private Trigger Strategies 
Up to this point, I have assumed that the range of private signals that trigger a punishment 
phase, 
D Ω , is fixed.  Countries can change the (initial) cooperative protection level by 
changing the range of punishment-phase-triggering private signals, 
D Ω , because it affects the 
probability of a punishment phase being triggered against the potential use of concealed trade 
  28barriers.  This section characterizes the optimal simple  PTS, or equivalently the optimal 
symmetric PTS with l0 = l and d0 = h (Corollary 2 to Proposition 2), focusing its analysis on the 
choice of 
D Ω  that maximizes the expected discounted payoffs of countries.  Once again I 
abbreviate optimal simple PTS by optimal PTS hereafter, unless it is necessary to distinguish 
them. 
The private signal ω ∈Ω has two distinctive yet related quality dimensions as a measure 
that detects the potential use of concealed protection.  One is the sensitivity of the signal in 
detecting possible defections, which links a higher protection to a higher probability of a 
punishment phase being triggered.  The other is the stability of the signal that rewards 
cooperative behaviors with a lower probability of a punishment phase.  I can represent the 
sensitivity by Pr
/(τ) ≡ ∂Pr(τ)/∂τ > 0 and the stability by 1 − Pr(τ) measured at τ = l .   
A change in the range of private signals that trigger a punishment phase may affect these 
qualities of signals in different directions.  In particular, countries may raise the sensitivity by 
properly expanding the range of punishment-phase-triggering private signals, 
D Ω , but at the 
cost of undermining the stability.  By denoting the degree of such expansion with a parameter 
ω
D, to be termed “a trigger control variable,” I can formalize this trade-off that countries face 
in choosing ω
D by assuming ∂Pr
/(τ)/∂ω
D > 0 and ∂Pr(τ)/∂ω
D > 0.  
The analysis of optimality in this section focuses on simple PTS identified in Proposition 1, 
with the cooperative protection level being determined by a choice over ω
D.  Assuming that ω
D 
uniquely determines l with I(l) = 0, I can represents l as a function of ω
D; l = l(ω
D).  Then, as 
shown by Corollary 2 to Proposition 2, 
(17) 
C C C
h l u l h u
l Pr
l l u












) , ( , 
where (s, s
*) are simple PTS defined in Definition 2.  Note that the expected discounted payoff 
in (17) is no longer depending on the lengths of punishment phases.  Therefore, I can describe 
the optimal choice for ω
D using the following first order condition: 
(18)       with , 0





























                                                                                                                                                 
34 One can derive H’s expected discounted payoff under symmetric PTS shown in the above corollary, from (6), 
using δ
C − δ = [u(h, l) − u(l, l)]/(VC − VN) and δ
C − δ
S = 2(δ
C − δ). 
  29  
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where I = I(l) is the implicit function defined in (13).  The first order condition is informative 
about the trade-off that countries face in choosing an optimal ω
D.  Raising the trigger control 
variable (ω
D) will have a positive effect on the expected discounted payoff (VC) by lowering the 
cooperative protection level (l) since ∂l/∂ω
D < 0 and ∂VC/∂l < 0, but it also has a negative effect 
on the expected payoff by raising the probability of a punishment phase being invoked, as 
shown by ∂VC /∂ω
D < 0 in (18).  Thus, the optimal ω
D should balance the gain from raising the 
sensitivity of the private signal (thus achieving a lower l) against the loss from reducing the 
stability of the cooperative equilibrium with a higher punishment phase probability.    
When the initial ω
D is at a very low level, then, it is generally possible to lower l by raising 
the trigger control variable.  For example, if 
D Ω  = ∅, then l = h and Pr(l) = Pr
/(l) = 0, implying 
∂l/∂ω
D < 0 with ∂Pr
/(l)/∂ω
D > 0 from (18).  If countries continue to raise ω
D, the marginal 
increase in the sensitivity of private signals in response to an increase in ω
D is likely to get 





2 < 0 and ∂
2Pr(l)/∂(ω
D)
2 = 0, with the latter assumption making the effect of a 
higher ω
D on Pr(l) to be constant.  Then, it is possible to have ∂
2l/∂(ω
D)
2 > 0 and ∂l/∂ω
D = 0 for 
a high enough ω
D.   
Even when it is possible to raise ω
D to such a point that the countries would no longer be 
able to lower the cooperative protection level any further (∂l/∂ω
D = 0), note that it is never 
optimal to do so.  If countries were to raise ω
D in this way, then the first order condition for the 
optimal ω
D in (18) will be violated with ∂VC /∂ω
D = (∂VC /∂Pr)(∂Pr(l)/∂ω
D)
 < 0, implying that 
countries can increase their payoffs by lowering the trigger control variable.  One can use a 
similar argument to show that setting l = 0 cannot be optimal when ∂u(l, l) /∂l = 0 at l = 0 and 
  30∂Pr(l)/∂l ≈ 0 at l = 0, as assumed in Proposition 1.  I summarize these characterizations of 
optimal simple PTS in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3.  Assume that the sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium simple 
PTS in Proposition 1 are satisfied.  In addition, assume that ∂Pr
/(l)/∂ω
D > 0, ∂Pr(τ)/∂ω





2 < 0, and ∂
2Pr(l)/∂(ω
D)
2 = 0 where ω
D denotes the trigger control variable 
associated with an expansion of 
D Ω .  Then, under the optimal PTS, countries do not raise the 
trigger control variable to the level that pushes down the cooperative protection level to its 
minimum attainable level where ∂l/∂ω
D = 0.  In particular, the optimal PTS will not set l = 0 
with ∂u(l, l) /∂l = 0 at l = 0.
35
 
The characterization of optimal PTS in Proposition 3 emphasizes the need for tolerating 
some level of concealed trade barriers under PTS.  For example, setting the concealed trade 
barriers to zero in the cooperative period is not optimal: a slightly higher cooperative protection 
level (by choosing a slightly lower ω
D) would cause no first order loss as free trade is efficient 
with ∂u(l, l) /∂l = 0 at l = 0 and would decrease the likelihood of a costly punishment phase 
being triggered.  One cannot directly apply PTS for understanding the working of Section 301 
of the U.S. under which the United States Trade Representative (USTR) follows an elaborate 
procedure prior initiating a punishment against potential deviatory actions of other countries.  
However, the following practice of Special Section 301 to protect U.S. intellectual property 
rights (IPR) in foreign markets does illustrate the U.S. government’s willingness to tolerate 
some level of deviations from agreements, reserving retaliatory sanctions mainly against 
considerable deviations.  In applying Special Section 301, the USTR specifies not only 
“Priority Foreign Countries” who are “pursuing the most onerous or egregious policies that 
have the greatest adverse impact on U.S. right holders or products, and are subject to 
accelerated investigations and possible sanctions,” but also “Priority Watch List” of countries 
“who do not provide an adequate level of IPR protection or enforcement, or market access for 
persons relying on intellectual property protection.”
36  Such a practice may not lead to the 
maximal protection of the U.S. IPR, but may reduce the probability of costly tariff wars 
invoked by Special Section 301.        
                                                 
35 A similar characterization has been drawn for optimal cartel trigger price strategies by Porter (1983).  
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4. A Possible Role for the WTO: Optimal Third Party Trigger Strategies 
 
Regarding the issue of enforcing international trade agreements, this paper focuses on a 
phenomenon that the trade literature has not fully explored; countries may form different 
opinions about potential violations of trade agreements.  In the absence of a third party like the 
WTO that can generate supposedly impartial opinions about such violations, Section 2 and 3 of 
this paper explore the possibility of countries’ adopting private trigger strategies, under which 
each country initiates punishment phases based on its own imperfect private signals of the other 
country’s potential use of concealed trade barriers.  In particular, this paper characterizes the 
optimal PTS as an attempt to describe what countries can achieve with regard to trade policy 
coordination in the absence of the WTO, a prerequisite for analyzing how the WTO can 
facilitate improved coordination, especially when the WTO can simply generate its opinion of 
potential violations without any coercive power to impose its opinions upon countries.  
To understand a possible role that the WTO can play under imperfect private monitoring of 
potential violations of trade agreements, this section analyzes “third-party trigger strategies” 
under which a third party, such as the WTO, decides upon whether a violation has occurred and 
allows each country to initiate a punishment phase based on its decision.  Given the 
characterization of optimal PTS of the previous section, the comparison between the optimal 
third-party trigger strategies and optimal PTS will illustrate how and to what degree the WTO 
can help countries to enforce international trade agreements beyond what countries can do 
alone.   
This paper, however, does not attempt to build a model that can proxy the actual operation 
of the WTO in dealing with potential violations and associated trade disputes: Though as I 
discuss in the conclusion, this in itself would be a meaningful research direction.  Instead, this 
section will consider third-party trigger strategies under which the only role that the WTO 
plays is providing an impartial third-party (thus, public) opinion of violations so that trigger 
strategies are no longer subject to constraints imposed by the private nature of countries’ 
signals of violations under private triggers strategies, such as ICP.  This analysis thus 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 These quoted definitions come from the USTR website (http://www.ustr.gov). 
  32illustrates the minimum role that the WTO can play in facilitating countries to improve their 
trade policy coordination.  
To make a direct comparison between third-party trigger strategies and PTS characterized 
in Section 3, I make the following assumptions in this section.  The stage-game payoffs and 
action variables of H and F are the same as those described in Section 2.  In addition to these 
two players, there exists the WTO, a third party supposedly neutral with regard to the issue of 
enforcing international trade agreements.  At the end of period t, the WTO obtains   ∈  t ω Ω  
and   ∈ 
∗
t ω
∗ Ω , the same private signals that each country receives of the other country’s 
potential violations.  One may model a mechanism under which each country truthfully reports 
its private signals to the WTO in a non-public manner if the WTO can verify the reported 
signals.  For simplicity, this section simply assumes that the WTO has an access to such signals.  
Given the setup of Section 2, then the WTO would have complete information of  t τ  and   
because the WTO knows all the random components of the model.  Even when one introduces 
additional random components into the model, the WTO may still have an informational 
superiority over countries given the access to private signals of both countries.  The analysis of 
how the WTO may utilize such an informational superiority, which itself is attributable to the 
WTO’s neutrality, is an interesting topic.  As mentioned earlier, this paper assumes away such 
a possibility, simply focusing on the possible role of the WTO in relaxing the constraints on the 
lengths of punishment phases imposed by the private nature of signals that trigger punishments, 
namely the conditions specified in Lemma 1 ( a).  Therefore, the following analysis will 
characterize how changing “private” trigger strategies into “third-party” ones through the 
WTO may improve the enforcement of international trade agreements, controlling the quality 




D Ω   denotes the range of private signals that triggers H (F) to initiate a 
punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff, but it is the WTO that tells each country to 
initiate such a punishment phase in third-party trigger strategies.  The infinitely repeated 
protection-setting game between H and F stays the same as before, except that now the WTO 
tells or does not tell each country to initiate a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff 
based on its own (the WTO’s) signals of potential deviations.  Note that these signals remain 
“not public” unless the WTO decides to make them “public.”  For simplicity, I denote the 
  33WTO’s decision to tell H to initiate a punishment phase in period t based on its signals received 
at the end of period t − 1 by μt-1 ∈ Μ  ≡ {1, 0}, with μt-1 being 1 iff ω t-1 ∈
D Ω , denoting its 
similar decision for F by μ
*
t-1 ∈  ≡ {1, 0}.  Then, a strategy for each country is defined by 
, similarly to the ones in Section 2, with  
∗ Μ
∞
= = 1 )) ( ( t
i W i W t s s
(19)         and    A E A t s
t t t t W → × × ×
− − ∗ − − 1 * 2 1 1 : ) ( Μ Μ
∗ − − − ∗ − ∗ ∗
→ × × × A E A t s
t t t t W 1 2 1 1
: ) ( Μ Μ
where   and  , respectively denote the history of the WTO’s decision of telling H and 
F to initiate a punishment phase up to period t − 1.  Note that strategies defined in (19) allow 
each country to observe the WTO’s decision for the other country to initiate a punishment 
phase only afterwards.  This strategy specification under which each country chooses its current 
action without knowing the WTO’s current decision on the other country’s initiation of a 
punishment phase may seem unnatural.  This specification, however, enables a direct 
comparison between third-party trigger strategies and PTS of Section 2 by making these two 
types of strategies differ only in their ability in selecting the lengths of punishment phases.  
1 − t Μ
1 − ∗t
Μ
Henceforth, the analysis will focus on third-party trigger strategies defined in Definition 4 
below. 
(i) Given  that  period  t − 1 was a “cooperative” period with  = (0, 0), each country 
keeps cooperating by setting  = (l, 0) as long as the WTO does not tell it to initiate 
to a punishment phase by having μ
) , ( 1 1
∗







i = 0 with i = * or none. 
(ii)  Given that period t − 1 was a “cooperative” period with  = (0, 0), the WTO tells 
H to initiate a punishment phase by setting   = (h, 0) iff   and it tells F to 
initiate a punishment phase by setting  = (h, 0) iff  . 
) , ( 1 1
∗
− − t t e e
) , ( t t e τ
D
t Ω ω ∈ −1
) , (
∗ ∗
t t e τ
D
t Ω ω ∈
∗
−1
(iii) Given that a “punishment phase” was initiated in period t  − 1 by only one country, 
countries set  ) , ( e τ  = (h, h) and   = (h, h) for the following (T− 2) periods and they 
continue to do so one more period with probability λ.  Given that a “punishment phase” 
was initiated in period t − 1 simultaneously by both countries, countries set 
) , (
∗ ∗ e τ
) , ( e τ  = (h, h) 
and  = (h, h) for the following (T ) , (
∗ ∗ e τ
S − 2) periods and they continue to do so one more 
period with probability λ
S.  T and T
S are integers that are greater than or equal to 2 with λ 
and λ
S belonging to [0, 1].  Each country knows these variables (T, T
S, λ, λ
S) when it 
  34initiates a punishment phase and the actual length of a punishment phase is determined by 
some public randomizing device (determining λ and λ
S) after a punishment phase being 
initiated. 
(iv) In period 1 and other “initial” periods right after the end of any punishment phase, with 
probability  Pr the WTO tells each country to initiate a punishment phase by setting 
= (h, h), and with probability (1 − Pr) the WTO does not tell each country to initiate 
a punishment phase so that it sets  = (l, 0), where Pr = Pr( ) with 
) , (
i i e τ
) , (
i i e τ
D i
t Ω ω ∈ ) , ( t t e τ = (l, 
0),  = (l, 0), and i = * or none.  ) , (
∗ ∗
t t e τ
 




W*) are third-party trigger 
strategies (TTS) with (l, Ω
D, T, T
S, λ, λ
S) as characterizing parameters. 
 






S), denoted by V
W(s
W, s
W*), is identical to V(s, s
*) in (6).  Once again, I 
have   and   respectively represent the (relative) length of the punishment 
phase initiated by one country and by both countries simultaneously.   
) ( δ δ −
C ) (
S C δ δ −
  While the expression for the expected discounted payoff is same under TTS defined above 
and under PTS defined in Definition 2, there exists an important distinction between these two 
types of trigger strategies: The WTO has no incentive to lie about its private signals so that TTS 
are not subject to the ICP.  This implies that one can choose any values for the lengths of 
punishment phases,   and   ∈ [0,  ].  Recall that   = [u(h, l ) ( δ δ −
C ) (
S C δ δ −
C δ δ δ −
C c) − u(l
c, 
l
c)]/(VC − VN) and   under PTS.  To make the comparison between the TTS 
and the PTS even simpler, I make one more assumption that   holds under 
TTS, thus allowing full flexibility only over the choice of  , the length of a single-
country-initiated punishment phase.  This assumption enables one to tell whether the lengths of 
punishment phases under the optimal PTS are too short or too long (com
) ( 2 ) ( δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
) ( 2 ) ( δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
) ( δ δ −
C
pared with the optimal 
TTS) by comparing the endogenously determined value for   under the optimal PTS 
with the optimal choice of   under the TTS.  Given this assumption of   
) ( δ δ −
C
) ( δ δ −
C = − ) (
S C δ δ
  35) ( 2 δ δ −
C , one can simplify V
W(s
W, s




W*) = (1 − Pr)[u(l, l) − u(h, h)]/[1 
− δ
C + 2Pr(δ
C− δ)]  + VN  with VN = u(h, h)/(1 − δ
C).  
  To be able to support TTS as an equilibrium of the repeated protection-setting game 
between H and F, TTS need to satisfy the following incentive constraint, denoted by IC
W:  
(IC
W)   I
W(l) ≡ ∂u(l, l)/∂τ −{δ
C[∂Pr(l)/∂τ ][1−Pr(l)][u(l, l) – u(l, h)+(δ
C–δ)(VC
W – VN)]} = 0. 
Note that IC
W is identical to IC in (12) under PTS as long as δ under TTS is the same as under 
PTS.  This equivalence results from constructing TTS in the way that it may only differ from 
PTS in its flexibility to choose the single-country-initiated punishment phase to last for any 
length.  The intuition behind this equivalence between IC under PTS and IC
W under TTS is 
quite simple: Each country chooses its cooperative-period protection level, knowing that raising 
the protection level increases the probability of a punishment phase being triggered in the same 
manner under both trigger strategies.  
  In addition to IC
W, there is one more incentive constraint that TTS needs to satisfy: Each 
country has an incentive to follow the WTO’s decision on initiating a punishment phase.   
Because the WTO’s decision becomes public (known to all players) with a one period lag, one 
may construct a (off-equilibrium-path) punishment strategy, such as a permanent Nash tariff 
war, against the behavior of not following the WTO’s decision on triggering a punishment 
phase.  Given that the expected discounted payoff under TTS is strictly greater than the 
discounted payoff of playing the static Nash tariff war forever, it is easy (and standard in the 
literature) to show that each country has an incentive to follow the WTO’s decision as long as 
the discount factor (δ
C) is high enough.  I assume that this standard result is valid for the 
following analysis with a high enough value for δ
C.    
  For the analytical simplicity, one can represent a choice of (T, λ) by a real number T
W ∈ [1, 
∞) with  =  .  T
W T C C ) (δ δ − ) ( δ δ −
C W = 1 (equivalent to the case of T = 2 and λ = 0) is the case 
where any country’s initiation of a punishment phase by imposing its static optimal tariff is not 
followed by any punishment period where countries play a Nash tariff war of setting their 
tariffs to be the static optimal ones, representing the shortest possible punishment phase.  T
W → 
∞ is the case where a permanent Nash tariff war is followed by an initiation of a punishment 
  36phase, representing the longest possible punishment phase.
37  Then, the problem of finding the 
optimal TTS is solving the following maximization problem: 
(20)  
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where ω
D represents a trigger control variable, defined in the same way as in Section 3.2.  
  Because the problem of finding the optimal PTS in Section 3.2 is to choose only ω
D to 
maximize the same payoff function as in (20) subject to the same incentive compatibility 
condition, but with T
W (or equivalently, corresponding T and λ) being determined by 
 = [u(h, l




W − VN), it is obvious that the optimal TTS of solving the 
maximization problem in (20) will yield an expected discounted payoff that is greater than (or 
at least equal to) that under the optimal PTS.  The question is how and to what degree the less-
constrained optimal TTS will outperform the optimal PTS.  
Analyzing the first order conditions of the maximization problem for the optimal TTS in 
(20) can provide some insight into the factors that determine the optimal choice of ω
D and T
W: 
(21)       
, 0
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37 Under TTS, it is not impossible to choose T
W ∈ (0, 1) by setting T = 1 and λ ∈ (0, 1).  For example, the WTO 
uses its own randomizing device in determining whether to tell each country to impose its static optimal tariff for 
one period or not with probability λ if ω ∈ Ω
D or ω
* ∈ Ω
D.  To make a direct comparison between PTS and TTS, 
once again I limit the choices of T
W with T
W ∈ [1, ∞).   
  37where I
W(l) represents the implicit function defining the IC
W above, ∂l/∂ω





W = − ( ∂I
W/∂T
W)/(∂I





W, respectively.  The expression after the second equality for ∂VC
W/∂T
W is obtained 
using the expression for ∂VC
W/∂Pr in (21).  As explained in Section 3.2, the optimal choice of 
ω
D involves the balance between its positive effect of lowering the cooperative protection and 
its negative effect of increasing the probability of costly punishment phases.  Similarly, 
increasing the length of a punishment phase has a positive effect of lowering the cooperative 
protection by strengthening the punishment but also entails a negative effect of increasing the 
cost of punishment with the costly punishment phase being longer.  The optimal choice of T
W 
also involves balancing between these counteracting forces.    
This section focuses on the analysis of an optimal choice of T
W because Section 3.2 
provides an analysis of the optimal choice over ω
D and a similar characterization should apply 
to the one under TTS.
38  For further characterization of an optimal choice of T
W, I assume that 
the optimal ω
D is an interior solution, thus dVC
W/dω
D = 0.  It is reasonable to assume that 
dVC
W/dω
D = 0 for any TTS that attains improvement over one-shot Nash equilibrium because a 
corner solution for ω
D implies either no punishment for any contingency (
D Ω  =  ∅) or 
punishment for all contingencies (
D Ω  = Ω ).  Using dVC
W/dω
D = 0 together with the second 
expression for ∂VC
W/∂T
W in (21), I can rewrite dVC
W/dT
W as follows: 
(22)  
0.      and    , 0   , 0 , 0 with 
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The above first order condition for an optimal choice of T
W, which also embodies the first order 
condition for the choice of ω
D, reveals a potentially “competing” nature of these two choice 
variables in restraining the use of concealed trade barriers.  ∂I
W/∂T
W < 0 and ∂I
W/∂ω
D < 0  
                                                 
38 For any given level of T
W, the optimal choice over ω
D under TTS should be the same kind of balancing choice as 
the one under PTS.  See the above discussion on the choice of ω
D in relation with (21). Therefore, the 
characterization of an optimal ω
D of Proposition 2 should apply to the optimal ω
D under TTS.
  38demonstrate that both of these choice variables can relax IC
W, which in turn enable countries to 
lower the cooperative protection level, l.  For example, if the effectiveness of ω
D in relaxing 
IC




D) increases, then the optimal 
choice of T
W may involve a decrease in T
W and an increase in ω
D to sustain dVC
W/dT









39  In fact, the following result establishes that the 
optimal T
W may take corner solutions depending on the probability of a punishment being 
triggered in the equilibrium, which in turn may depend on the accuracy of information about 
potential deviations, as shown through a numerical analysis that follows this analytical result: 
 
Proposition 4. Given that ∂Pr
/(l)/∂ω
D > 0, ∂Pr(τ)/∂ω








2 = 0 as assumed in Proposition 3 for the characterization of optimal PTS, 
(a)  the length of a single-country initiated punishment phase, T
W, equals 1 under the optimal 
TTS if Pr(l) < Pr , where 
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(b)    the length of a single-country initiated punishment phase, T
W, goes to ∞ under the optimal 
TTS if Pr(l) > Pr , where 
   ,
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 with  ) 1 , 0 ( )] , ( ) , ( /[ )] , ( ) , ( [ ∈ − − h l u l l u h h u l l u  for  ) , 0 [ h l ∈  so that  ) 2 / 1 , 3 / 1 ( ∈ Pr . 
(See Appendix for Proof) 
 
 According  to  Proposition 4, the length of a single-country initiated punishment phase 
under the optimal TTS takes its minimum value of T
W = 1 if the probability of a punishment 
phase being triggered is below a critical level, denoted by Pr .  With T
W = 1, note that no tariff 
war period (under which both countries impose their static optimal tariffs) will follow an 
initiation of any punishment phase.  This implies an asymmetric (in the sense that only the 
potential deviator is punished with the punishing country being rewarded by imposing its static 
                                                 




2 > 0 but it seems to be very difficult prove that ∂(A∂I
W/∂ω
D)/∂ω
D < 0 given the 
  39optimal tariff) and minimum (in the sense that the punishment length is taking its minimum 
value) punishment against potential violations.  Note also that countries cannot use such an 
asymmetric and minimum punishment under PTS because countries will have an incentive to 
initiate such a punishment phase regardless of their private signals.  The presence of the WTO, 
a third party who impartially judges whether a country (might have) violated a trade agreement 
allows countries to use an asymmetric and minimum punishment, facilitating countries to 
realize higher expected payoffs beyond what they can do by themselves under PTS.
40
       This asymmetric and minimum punishment (T
W = 1) is optimal when the probability of a 
punishment phase being triggered, Pr(l) is less than a critical level, Pr .  As briefly discussed 
with regard to the first order condition for choosing T
W in (22), one can understand this 
(sufficient) condition for T
W = 1 by looking at how a change in Pr(l) affects the relative 
effectiveness of T
W and ω
D in relaxing the incentive constraint, IC
W.  In fact, one can show that 
the (relative) effectiveness of ω
D increases faster than the effectiveness of T
W in response to a 
decrease in Pr(l) so that the effectiveness of ω
D is greater than that of T
W for all values of T
W 
when Pr(l) < Pr , thus having dVC
W/dT
W < 0 for all T
W ∈ [1, ∞).  The effectiveness of ω
D 
relative to T
W is measured by the absolute value of A(∂I
W/∂ω
D) relative to the absolute value of 
∂I
W/∂T
W in the second bracket of (22). 
  0 / < ∂ ∂
C Pr δ  in Proposition 4 implies that the optimal TTS is less likely to involve T
W = 1 
when countries’ relative valuations of future payoffs increase with higher values of δ
C.  Once 
again, one can understand this result by examining how a change in δ
C affects the relative 
effectiveness of T
W and ω
D in relaxing the incentive constraint, IC
W:  One can show that the 
effectiveness of T
W increases faster than that of ω
D in response to an increase in δ
C so that the 
optimal TTS is less likely to set T
W = 1 when δ
C is higher.  If δ
C = 1/2, for example, Pr  = 1/4, 
implying that T
W = 1 is optimal under TTS if the probability of a punishment being triggered is 
less than 1/4, and Pr  decreases toward zero as δ
C approaches 1.   
  Proposition 4 (b) shows that T
W → ∞ may also emerge as an optimal punishment length 
choice under TTS if the probability of a punishment phase being triggered is above a critical 
                                                                                                                                                 
highly non-linear nature of A in ω
D, unless one introduces stringent assumptions on Pr.  
40 This kind of asymmetric action is often one of important characteristics of optimal strategies of repeated games 
under various applications, such as in Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Compte (1998), and Athey and Bagwell 
(2001), because such asymmetry allows players to avoid actions with (at least heavy) dead-weight losses.  
  40level, denoted by Pr .  This maximum punishment of playing the Nash tariff war forever once a 
punishment is triggered is a surprising result because the main reason for countries to 
coordinate their trade policies is to avoid playing the Nash tariff war, and because they can 
choose any length for their punishment phase under TTS.  Again, it is possible to understand 
this sufficient condition for T
W → ∞ by looking at how a change in Pr(l) affects the relative 
effectiveness of T
W and ω
D in relaxing the incentive constraint, IC
W.  The effectiveness of ω
D 
decreases faster than that of T
W in response to an increase in Pr(l) so that the effectiveness of 
ω
D is smaller than that of T
W even when T
W → ∞ if Pr(l) > Pr , thus having dVC
W/dT
W > 0 even 
when T
W → ∞.   
  Proposition 4 provides a characterization of the optimal TTS, which depends on the 
probability of a punishment phase being triggered right after a cooperative period.  One may 
find that such a characterization is not satisfactory because the characterization relies on Pr(l), 
a variable that countries choose indirectly by choosing ω
D.
41  One may also wonder about the 
possibility of more directly comparing the optimal PTS and the TTS, thus finding when they 
will differ from each other and how they will differ.
42  In response to such demands, one may 
try to introduce more structures to the private signals, thus making Pr(l) depend on some 
accuracy measure of private signals, then characterize the optimal TTS (and the optimal PTS) 
depending on such a fundamental variable.  Because of the highly non-linear nature of the 
maximization problem involving two choice variables (T
W and ω
D) as shown through the first 
order condition in (22), pursuing such a characterization is extremely difficult, if not 
infeasible.
43   
While it might not be possible to derive complete analytical results regarding the 
characterization of the optimal TTS and optimal PTS in the way the preceding paragraph 
discusses, one can conduct a numerical analysis for such characterization.  The following 
numerical analysis does just that and reveals several interesting (numerical) results.  To conduct 
                                                 
41 A positive side of the characterization of optimal TTS in Proposition 4 is that it imposes relatively weak 
assumptions on private signals and is still able to drive a relatively sharp prediction of when the corner solutions 
will emerge as an optimal choice for T
W, depending on the equilibrium values of Pr(l).  
42 Proposition 4 does provide results that show how and when the optimal TTS would differ from the optimal PTS 
because neither T
W = 1 nor T
W → ∞ occur under PTS.  What is missing is a more continuous comparison of the 
two strategies, possibly depending on some fundamental variables, such as a measure for accuracy of signals.  
43 As shown in the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix, proving the results in Proposition 4 itself is not a trivial 
exercise given the highly nonlinear nature of the optimization problem to solve.  
  41a numerical analysis, I use the same partial equilibrium trade model as the one in Bond and 
Park (2002) where H exports good 1 and F exports good 2, with σ ∈ [1, ∞) denoting the size of 
H’s markets relative to F’s.
44  Demand for good i in H is  ) ( i i Bp A D − =σ  and supply of good i 
in H is  ) ( i i i p X β α σ + = , where pi is the price of good i in H with i = 1 or 2.  For F, demand 
and supply are given by   and  .  To ensure that H will export good 
1 and import good 2 and that the countries will be symmetric when σ = 1, 
 and  .  In addition, I assume that Pr(l) takes the following 
functional form: 
∗ ∗ − = i i Bp A D
∗ ∗ ∗ + = i i i p X β α
0 2 2 1 1 > − = −
∗ ∗ α α α α
∗ = 2 1 α α
(23)  
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where  , / 2   χρ ω χ − ≡
D l  1/χ∈ (0,∞) represents the sensitivity of the signal in detecting an 
increase in the level of concealed trade barriers, and ρ ∈ [0, ∞) represents the level of errors in 
detecting concealed trade barriers (thus, the “in-”stability of the signals), making Pr(l) > 0  
even when l = 0 with ρ > 0 and ω
D (∈[0, 1/ρ)) > 0.  While the complicated expression for Pr(l) 
with l > l/2 is used to make the probability density function to be symmetric around l/2 and 
Pr(l) = 1 when l = l, the equilibrium values for l are all less than l/2 in the following numerical 
analysis, thus making this part of the probability definition be redundant.  Pr(l) defined in (23) 
is one of simplest functional forms for Pr(l) with parameters representing both the sensitivity 
and (in)stability of private signal and also having ∂Pr(l)/∂l > 0, ∂
2Pr(l)/∂(l)








2 < 0, and ∂
2Pr(l)/∂(ω
D)
2 = 0 for l  ≤  l/2, as assumed in 
Proposition 4.
45     
                                                 
44 In a previous version of this paper, there was a section that provides an analysis of PTS in the presence of 
asymmetry in the size of trading countries.  The following concluding section briefly discusses the effect of 
introducing such asymmetry on PTS as a factor that may limit the use of PTS in restraining concealed trade 
barriers. 
45 One may find Pr(l) = 1 for l > l not satisfying, especially when l < h.  Thus, one can consider using an adjusted 
Rayleigh distribution,  ] ) 2 /( ) ( exp[ 1 ) , ; ( ) (
2 2 D D D l l Pr   l ρω χ ω χ ρ ω − − − = = Pr  for the numerical analysis because 
Pr(l) < 1 for all l ∈ [0, ∞).  The problem associated with using this Rayleigh distribution is that ∂
2Pr(l)/∂(ω
D)
2 = 0 
is no longer true, and this assumption is what enables simplification of the first order condition for T
W in (22), 
which in turn leads to the analytical results in Proposition 4.  As a robustness check, I have done a numerical 
analysis using this probability function and found that characteristics of the optimal PTS and optimal TTS are 
qualitatively identical to those shown in the numerical analysis of this section using Pr(l) in (23).  
  42I assume that σ = 1 to analyze the case of symmetric countries, and also assume that α1 − 
α1
* = 3, β + B = 1, which induces h = 1 for simplicity.
46  To illustrate how the optimal TTS 
change as the instability of the private signal (measured by ρ) changes, Figure 4 shows the 
outcome of the numerical analysis with χ = 1 and δ
C = 0.5.  It indicates how each of the 
following changes in response to an increase in the instability of the signal, ρ, from 
80(×0.00005) to 130.2(×0.00005): (i) the expected percentage payoff gain under the optimal 
TTS compared with playing the static Nash tariff war forever, (VC
W  −  VN)/VN ; (ii) the 
cooperative protection level, l; (iii) the probability of a punishment phase being triggered, Pr(l); 
(iv) the length of a punishment phase, T
W; and (v) the trigger control variable choice, ω
D.  
As predicted by Proposition 4, T
W = 1 when Pr(l) < Pr = 1/4 (using δ
C = 0.5) and T
W → ∞ 
when Pr(l) > 4/9, using the fact that the maximum value that Pr  can take is 4/9 as [u(l, l) − u(h, 
h)]/[u(l, l) − u(l, h)] reaches its minimum at 2/5 with l = 0 given the parameter values of the 
trade model under consideration.  It also confirms the conjecture that the probability of a 
punishment phase being triggered in the equilibrium would depend on the accuracy of 
information about potential deviations (at least in the limits), thus having T
W = 1 for low 
enough values of ρ and T
W → ∞ for high enough values of ρ.  Another notable aspect of this 
numerical result is that Pr(l) decreases in response to an increase in ρ, the instability (or 
inaccuracy) measure of private signals, when optimal TTS utilize both ω
D and T
W (> 1).  A 
possible explanation for this phenomenon once again can be based on the relative effectiveness 
of ω
D and T
W in relaxing IC
W:  If the effectiveness of T
W relative to ω
D improves as ρ increases, 
then countries will substitute ω
D with T
W, implying a lower ω
D and a higher T
W as shown in the 




                                                 
46 In deriving this result, I assume that each country’s welfare function (as a function of τ and τ
*) derived from 
demand and supply functions with no uncertainties is identical to the ones derived with uncertainties described in 
Section 2.1.  This is a strong assumption but justifiable given the fact that what one really needs are u(τ, τ ) and 
u (τ , τ) with ∂u(τ, τ )/∂τ > 0 at τ = 0, ∂u (τ*, τ)/∂τ < 0, ∂[u(τ, τ ) + u (τ*, τ)]/∂τ < 0, ∂ u(τ, τ )/∂τ  < 0, and ∂ u(τ, 
τ )/∂τ∂τ  = 0, properties of welfare functions of the trade model of Bond and Park (2002).  
*
* * * * * * 2 * 2 2
* *
47 This explanation of ∂Pr(l)/∂ρ < 0 for internal values of T
W seams to be in conflict with the following explanation 
for Proposition 4 (a) given earlier, “the (relative) effectiveness of ω
D increases faster than that of T
W in response to 
a decrease in Pr(l),” because ω
D decreases and T
W increases when Pr(l) decreases in response to an increase in ρ in 
the bottom 3 graphs of Figure 4.  However, these are not contradictory explanations because the explanation for 
Proposition 4 (a) is explaining how the corner solution of T
W = 1 may rise for small values of Pr(l) by changing 
  43 Another interesting exercise one can do with this numerical analysis is to compare the 
optimal TTS with optimal PTS.  Continuing to assume the same parameter values, except for χ 
being 100 instead of being 1 (thus, the sensitivity of private signals being lower), Figure 5 
compares the optimal TTS and the optimal PTS in all the same 5 variables as in Figure 4 when 
ρ increases from 30(×0.000005) to 61.9(×0.000005).  Note that the bold lines represent 
variables for the optimal TTS and the dotted lines depict variables for the optimal PTS.  The 
graphs on the right column in Figure 5 provide zoomed graphs of the same 5 variables for high 
values of ρ, from 59(×0.000005) to 61.9(×0.000005) because the variable for the TTS and the 
PTS are very similar for these high values of ρ.  One obvious result is that the gains from 
cooperation under the TTS are higher than those under PTS (being identical only when ρ = 60.5 
in Figure 5 with all other variables being identical as well, as they should be).  One less obvious 
but potentially important result is that the gains from moving from the optimal PTS to the 
optimal TTS are significant when the signals are relatively accurate with low values for ρ.  As 
one can easily tell from the top graphs in Figure 5, such gains can become negligible for high 
values of ρ.  It is important to note that the significant gains from moving from the optimal PTS 
to the optimal TTS come from countries’ ability to reduce the length of punishment phase and 
substitute it with a higher value for ω
D under TTS.  The probability of a punishment phase 
being triggered is higher under TTS than under PTS for all ρ < 60.5 due to a higher value for ω
D.  
This higher value for ω
D enables to countries to support a lower protection level under TTS than 
under PTS, as shown in Figure 5 for ρ < 60.5. 
Given the analytical results in Proposition 4 as well as the numerical ones shown in Figure 
4 and 5, I can highlight the main potential benefit of the WTO’s presence in enforcing 
international trade agreements as follows.  Even when the (private) signals of violations are 
relatively accurate, it might be hard for countries to be responsive against potential violations 
(choosing a higher value for ω
D) under PTS because initiating a punishment should and will 
accompany a rather long and costly tariff-war phase between countries (to eliminate the 
incentive to abuse the punishment).  Once countries can utilize opinions of an impartial third 
party, such as the WTO, then countries can employ a more effective punishment, possibly the 
                                                                                                                                                 




  44asymmetric and minimum punishment with T
W = 1, which in turn enables countries to be less 
tolerant of potential violations, attaining a higher level of cooperation! 
  
 
5. Concluding Remarks         
 
In the presence of concealed trade barriers of which each country has imperfect private 
signals, the WTO can facilitate a better cooperative equilibrium in the repeated trade 
relationship.  This is established by comparing the optimal PTS (private trigger strategies) in 
which each country triggers a punishment phase based on its own private signals with the 
optimal  TTS ( third-party trigger  strategies) in which the WTO tells who should start a 
punishment phase based on its (the WTO’s) signals, abstracting away from any informational 
advantage or disadvantage of the WTO over trading countries.  Prior to discussing the role of 
the WTO, the analysis first establishes that symmetric countries may restrain the use of 
concealed trade barriers under simple PTS if the sensitivity of their private signals rises in 
response to an increase in such barriers.  It also shows that any equilibrium payoff under almost 
strongly symmetric PTS will be identical to the one under simple PTS as long as the initial 
punishment is triggered by a static optimal tariff, justifying the focus on simple PTS.  The 
analysis of optimal (simple) PTS reveals that it is not optimal to push down the cooperative 
protection level to its minimum attainable level (such as free trade) due to the cost associated 
with increasing the probability of costly punishments.   
To illustrate how and by what degree the WTO may facilitate countries in enforcing 
international trade agreements beyond what they can achieve alone under PTS, this paper 
conducts both an analytical analysis of the optimal TTS and a numerical comparison of the 
optimal PTS and optimal TTS.  If the probability of a punishment phase being triggered is low 
enough, possibly because of accurate enough signals of potential violations, the analytical 
analysis establishes that the optimal TTS entail an asymmetric and minimum punishment.   The 
punishment is asymmetric in the sense that only the potential deviator is punished with the 
punishing country being rewarded by imposing its static optimal tariff and minimum in the 
sense that the punishment length is taking its minimum value.  Just the opposite result of using 
a punishment involving a permanent Nash tariff war will emerge under the optimal TTS if the 
probability of a punishment being triggered is high enough, possibly because of inaccurate 
  45signals of violations.  The presence of the WTO under TTS changes the nature of signals that 
trigger punishments from private into public, enabling countries to employ punishment phases 
of any length, which in turn can help countries to attain a better cooperative equilibrium.  The 
numerical analysis illustrates that the WTO’s contribution is likely to be more significant when 
its private signals are relatively accurate so that the lengths of punishment phases are shorter 
than those under the optimal PTS, possibly involving the asymmetric and minimum punishment.  
With regard to the effectiveness of PTS, there exist other factors that may severely limit the 
use of PTS so that countries cannot support any level of cooperation, as analyzed in a previous 
version of this paper.  One is a reduction in each country’s time lag in readjusting its tariff 
protection level in response to the other country’s initiation of a punishment phase by imposing 
an explicit tariff.  The other is asymmetry among countries.  Both of these factors may limit the 
level of cooperation attainable under PTS by reducing the lengths of punishment phases that 
countries can employ against potential deviations.   
Recall that each country is willing to initiate a punishment phase involving costly tariff war 
periods under PTS because it can realize some gains in the initial period of a punishment phase 
by imposing its static optimal tariff unilaterally.  If countries can readjust their tariff levels 
faster so that countries play the static Nash tariff war (almost) instantaneously in response to an 
initiation of a punishment, then no length of a punishment phase would satisfy the incentive 
compatibility condition for truthful revelation of private information (ICP).
48  This is because 
countries will only lose from initiating a punishment, thus making it impossible to support any 
cooperation under PTS.
49  If there exists a large enough asymmetry among trading countries, a 
similar problem will rise under PTS.  When one of two trading countries gets very small 
compared to the other one, then the small country’s static optimal tariff goes to zero because its 
                                                 
48 It is sometimes argued that enforcement constraints cannot be relevant in the trade policy setting, since a 
government can retaliate almost immediately whenever another government defects.  This result suggests that such 
an argument is based on a public-action model and requires substantial modification in a private monitoring setting, 
as pointed out by a referee of this paper.     
49 Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) and more recently Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) show that shortening the 
period over which actions are held fixed can hurt the possibilities for cooperation under imperfect public 
monitoring, possibly leading to the impossibility of cooperation.  While their impossibility of cooperation outcome 
from shortening the period over which actions are held fixed is similar to the one under PTS, the driving forces 
behind these impossibility results are different.  Under imperfect public monitoring, shorter periods of fixed action 
multiply the ways that player can deviate from the equilibrium, leading to the impossibility.  Under PTS, the 
impossibility of cooperation arises not because countries can deviate more effectively (the period over which 
concealed trade barriers are held fixed remains constant and only the period of readjusting tariff levels in response 
  46ability to change the terms of trade by imposing tariff becomes negligible.
50  This implies that 
there will be no length of a punishment phase satisfying the incentive compatibility condition 
for the small country, thus eliminating the possibility of supporting any cooperation under 
PTS.
51   
In the presence of factors that may limit the credibility of initiating strong punishments 
against potential deviations under PTS, once again the WTO may facilitate cooperation by 
changing the nature of information that triggers punishments from private into public, which in 
turn restores the credibility of punishments.  For example, the WTO mandates a regular review 
of its members under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), generating “public” 
reports which consist of detailed chapters examining the trade policies and practices of the 
members.  According to the WTO’s website, “Surveillance of national trade policies is a 
fundamentally important activity running throughout the work of the WTO.  At the centre of 
this work is the TPRM.” 
Another activity that the WTO does in enforcing trade agreements is settling disputes 
through its Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP).  When countries form different opinions of 
potential violations based on their imperfect and private information, the DSP of the WTO may 
generate third-party rulings on disputed cases, thus public signals about potential deviations.  
As emphasized in this paper through the analysis of the optimal TTS, the availability of an 
impartial third party’s opinion may enable countries to adopt a more efficient punishment, such 
as the asymmetric and minimum punishment.  This in turn enables countries to be more 
                                                                                                                                                 
to initiations of punishment phases shortens) but because the punishments that countries can use against deviations 
weaken.  
50 McLaren (1999) and Park (2000) analyze trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size where a small 
country has no ability to change the terms of trade by its tariff so that its static optimal tariff is zero.   
51 Formal proofs for these results can be found in an earlier version of this paper, “Private Trigger Strategies in the 
Presence of Concealed Trade Barriers.”  As correctly pointed out by one of referees of this paper, a proper way to 
introduce a change in the speed of readjusting tariff protection levels is to make the model into one in which 
information arrives continuously over time and to shorten the period under which tariff levels are held fixed.  The 
ad-hoc approach of changing the payoff function to some convex combination of the payoff before and after the 
readjustment of tariffs is adopted to introduce a change in the readjustment speed of tariffs without any change in 
the basic structure of the model and without any change in the readjustment speed of concealed trade barriers.  
This reflects that the readjustment of concealed trade barriers may take longer than readjusting tariffs because 
concealed trade barriers often rely on customary practices or implicit agreements but each country may readjust its 
tariff level by simply issuing an executive order.  Given the logic of the proof, however, the impossibility of 
cooperation result should be still valid under a proper modeling of a change in the readjustment speed of tariffs.  A 
referee’s questioning the focus on the symmetry in the triggering event (Ω
D = Ω
D*) in the presence of asymmetry 
among countries is also legitimate, but the impossibility of cooperation result under a large enough asymmetry 
among countries should be valid even when one considers asymmetric triggering events with Ω
D ≠ Ω
D*.    
  47responsive of potential violations and as a result attain a higher level of cooperation compared 
to the situation with no DSP.   
While this paper provides a new way of understanding the role that the WTO plays in 
enforcing international trade agreements, there is still much to be done for a more complete 
understanding of its role in dispute settlements.
52  For example, the DSP of the WTO 
encourages settlements through consultations among disputing parties as a preferred way to 
settle trade disputes.  According to the official website of the WTO, “The priority is to settle 
disputes, through consultations if possible.  By July 2005, only 130 of the nearly 332 WTO’s 
dispute cases had reached the full panel process.  Most of the rest have either been notified as 
settled “out of court” or remain in a prolonged consultation phase — some since 1995.”
 53  This 
indicates that the DSP plays a role that goes beyond simply generating public signals of 
potential deviations.  Carefully analyzing the role that the DSP of the WTO plays in the context 
of imperfect private monitoring of potential violations, especially regarding settlements through 
consultations, would be a meaningful extension of this paper.   
                                                 
52 Maggi and Stagier (2008) analyze the possible role that the DSP of the WTO plays in completing an incomplete 
contract, characterizing the optimal choice of contractual incompleteness and the DSP design. 
53 This quote comes from the following website: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm.
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  50Appendix 
 
Proof for Lemma 1 (a) 
It is obvious that ICP is a necessary condition and ICP becomes  = [u(h, l) − u(l, l)]/(V δ δ −
C
C − 
VN)] if  .  Therefore, I only need to show that   is  also  a 
necessary condition for each country to truthfully represent its private signals under PTS.  Note that ICP 
only provides the incentive for each country to truthfully initiate a punishment phase given that it was 
following the equilibrium strategy of setting τ = l in a pervious (cooperative) period.  Even when ICP is 
satisfied, there is a deviation possibility of settingτ ≠ l in a current period and starting a punishment 
phase in a following period regardless of its private signal, upon the contingency of no punishment 
phase being initiated in that current period.  In an equilibrium of the repeated game, there should be no 
such deviation incentive and the following argument will prove that   is necessary 
for eliminating such an incentive.   
) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C ) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
For PTS defined in Definition 2 to be equilibrium strategies, each country should have no incentive 
to set τ ≠ l in any period following a cooperative one (or in any “initial” period) unless it desires to 
initiate a punishment phase by setting τ = e = h, regardless of whether it would initiate a punishment or 
continue cooperating in a following period, upon the contingency of no punishment phase being 
initiated.  To derive the (necessary) condition for such an equilibrium behavior, first note that the 
expected discounted payoff of setting its total protection level to equal τ in any period following a 
cooperative one is     
]}, ) , ( )][ ( 1 [ ] ) ( ) , ( )[ ( ) , ( ){ 1 (
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depending on whether H continues to cooperate (by setting its total protection level to equal l) or initiate 
a punishment phase (by setting its total protection level to equal h), respectively, in the following period 
upon the contingency of no punishment phase being initiated after setting its total protection level to 
equal τ.  To be able to support τ = l, the following first order conditions need to be satisfied for each of 





C − VN)] for the first expression, and ∂u(l, l)/∂τ = (1 − Pr)[∂Pr(l)/∂l][u(h, l) − u(h, h) + 
( )(V
C δ
S δ δ − C − VN)] for the second one.  Using u(l, l) − u(l, h) = u(h, l) − u(h, h), these two first order 
conditions imply that  =  , or equivalently  .  δ δ −
C S δ δ − ) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
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Proof for Lemma 1 (b) 
I will prove Lemma 1 (b) in the following way.  First, I will assume the existence of ( ) that 




C − VN)] and   so that  ) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C ) , (
∗ ≡ s s V VC  in (6) can 
be rewritten into a simpler form.  Given   and Pr ≈ 0, then I will show that there exists indeed a 




Using  , I can simplify  ) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C ) , (
∗ s s V  in (6) into   
with  .  To denote 
the value of 
N
C C
C V Pr k V + − + − = )] ( 2 1 /[ δ δ δ
)] , ( ) , ( )[ 1 ( )] , ( ) , ( )[ 1 ( )] , ( ) , ( )[ 1 (
2 l l u l h u Pr Pr l l u h l u Pr Pr h h u l l u Pr k − − + − − + − − =
δ  that satisfies ICP with  , define  N
C C
C C V Pr k V V + − + − ≡ = )] ( 2 1 /[ ) ( 0 0 δ δ δ δ ≡ ) ( 0 δ δe  
If there exists a unique value of 
. / )] ( 2 1 )][ , ( ) , ( [ )] , ( ) ( ) 1 /[( )] , ( ) , ( )[ 1 ( 0 0 k Pr l l u l h u h h u V l l u l h u
C C C
C
C C C δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ − + − − − = − − − − −
0 δ  ∈ (0,  ) such that 
C δ 0 0) ( δ δ δ = e  and   when 
 and  Pr  ≈ 0, then proof is done for Lemma 1 ( b).  First, note that 
) , 0 ( 2 0
C C S δ δ δ δ ∈ − =
1 ≈
C δ 0 0 / ) ( δ δ δ ∂ ∂ e  
approaches zero if Pr ≈ 0.  Second, note that  0 / )] , ( ) , ( [ 2 > − = k l l u l h u Pr ) ( 0 δ δe  approaches   with 
 when   and Pr ≈ 0, including the case with 
C δ
C
e δ δ δ < ) ( 0 1 ≈
C δ 0 0 = δ .   These two facts together imply 
that there exists a unique value of  0 δ  ∈ (0,  ) such that 
C δ 0 0) ( δ δ δ = e  when   and  Pr  ≈ 0.   
Because   and  for 
1 ≈
C δ
C δ δ < 0
C δ δ ≈ 0 0 δ  satisfying  0 0) ( δ δ δ = e  when   and  Pr  ≈ 0,   
.   
1 ≈
C δ
C S δ δ δ − = 0 2
) , 0 (
C δ ∈
 
Proof for Lemma 2 
Proofs for the results in Lemma 2 follow the same logics as the proofs for the corresponding results 
in Stokey and Lucas (1989).  More specifically, Theorem 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 in Stokey and Lucas 
correspond to (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of Lemma 2 (a), respectively.  One may also find corresponding 
proofs for Lemma 2 (b) and Lemma 2 (c) in Theorem 4.6 in Stokey and Lucus.  To save the space, I 
discuss how one can adjust the corresponding proofs in Stockey and Lucas to prove the results in 
Lemma 2.  A complete proof for Lemma 2 is available upon request.     
        
For Lemma 2 (a):   
Let Γ: X → X denote the correspondence describing the feasibility constraints with X =[0, h]. Given 
x0 ∈ X, let Π(x0) ={ : x
∞
=0 } { t t x t+1 ∈ Γ(xt), t = 0, 1, …} be the set of plan that are feasible from x0.  Define 
F(xt, xt+1) as F(⋅) in (8).  Then, Assumption 4.1 in Stokey and Lucas is satisfied.  I modify Assumption 
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Define u:  R x → ∏ ) ( 0  by  ) ( ) ( x u im l x u n
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= .  Then, it is easy to show that Lemma 4.1 in Stocky and 
Lucas holds when one replaces  ) ( ) , ( ) (
/
1 0 x u x x F x u
C δ + =  with  () () ) ( 1 ) , ( ) (
/
0 1 0 x u x Pr x x F x u
C − + = δ .  
Having v
* and v in Stocky and Lucas representing VS and V in Lemma 2, I can also show that Theorem 
4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 hold for these newly defined variables, replacing  
of (9) in Stocky and Lucas with 
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C
t t t x v x Pr x x F x v δ .  While one needs to modify 
some lines of proofs in Stocky and Lucas, it is a pretty straightforward extension of the logics of their 
proofs, as mentioned earlier.  
 
For Lemma 2 (b) and (c):   
First note that Lemma 2 (b) and Lemma 2 (c) correspond to Theorem 4.6 of Stocky and Lucas.  
Also note that Theorem 4.6 basically uses the Contraction Mapping Theorem (Theorem 3.2) and the 
Theorem of Maximum (Theorem 3.6) to prove the results.  To show that the proof in Theorem 4.6 
works for proving Lemma 2 (b) and Lemma 2 (c), I establish the following result.  Define an operator T 
by (Tv)(x) =  {F(x,  y) + δ
] , 0 [ h y
Max
∈
C[1  −  Pr(x)]v(y)}.  T satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient condition for 
contraction mapping as it satisfies both “Monotonicity” and “Discounting” criteria: 
(Monotonicity)  
If  v(y)  ≤  w(y) for all values of y, then Tv(y)  ≤  Tw(y) because [1 −  Pr(x)]  ≥ 0 by definition.           
(Discounting) 
 T(v + a)(x) =  {F(x, y) + δ
] , 0 [ h y
Max
∈
C[1 − Pr(x)][v(y) + a]} =  {F(x, y) + δ
] , 0 [ h y
Max
∈
C[1 − Pr(x)]v(y) + δ
C[1 − 
Pr(x)]a}} = (Tv)(x) + δ
C[1 − Pr(x)]a ≤ (Tv)(x) + δ
Ca because [1 − Pr(x)] ∈ [0,1]. 
In addition, T: C(X) → C(X) from the Theorem of Maximum with C(X) denoting the set of bounded 
continuous functions f: X → R.  Thus, T: C(X) → C(X) is a contraction mapping with modulus δ
C, 
implying that I can apply the Contraction Mapping Theorem to T.  Thus, I can show that Lemma 2 (b) 
and (c) hold using the Theorem of Maximum as in Theorem 4.6. 
 
Proof for Lemma 3 
For Lemma 3 (a): 
  53Define f(τ−1, τ) ≡ F(τ−1, τ) + δ
C[1 – Pr(τ−1)]V(τ).  Note that f(τ−1, τ) is everywhere differentiable 
w.r.t. τ−1 for all τ ∈ [0, h] and ∂f(τ−1, τ)/∂τ−1 = – [∂Pr(τ−1)/∂τ−1]{u(τ, l) + δ
CV(τ) – u(τ, h) – (δ
C – δ)
 VN  – 
δVC} is bounded for all τ ∈ [0, h].  This implies that f(τ−1, τ) is absolutely continuous w.r.t. τ−1 for all τ 
∈ [0, h].  Therefore, I can use Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) in deriving the following 
expression 
(A1)  () [] ∫
− ∂ ∂ + = −
1
0 1 ) ( , ) 0 ( ) (
τ
τ dm m m g m f V V ,  
where g(m) ∈ G(m) and ∂f(m,g(m))/∂m = – [∂Pr
*(m)/∂m]{u(g(m), l) + δ
CV(g(m)) – u(g(m), h) – (δ
C – 
δ)VN  – δVC}.  
(A1) implies that V(τ−1) will be strictly decreasing in τ−1 ∈ [0, h], if u[g(m), l] + δ
CV(g(m)) – u(g(m), 
h) – (δ
C – δ)VN  – δVC > 0 for all m ∈ [0, h], because ∂Pr(m)/∂m > 0 by assumption.  To show that 
u(g(m), l) + δ
CV(g(m)) – u(g(m), h) – (δ
C – δ)VN  – δVC > 0 for all m ∈ [0, h] > 0, I first establish that the 
inequality holds for any g(m) ≤ l, and then show that the inequality holds for any g(m) > l.  
First, assume that g(m) ≤ l.  To have u(g(m), l) + δ
CV(g(m)) ≤ u(g(m), h) + (δ
C – δ)
 VN  + δ
 VC, VC > 
V(g(m)) because u(g(m), l) > u(g(m), h) with l
 < h and V(g(m)) ≥ VN.  The last inequality is obvious 
because the strategy of always setting τ  = h will generate a discounted expected payoff at least as good 
as  VN, regardless of g(m) taking any feasible values.  V(g(m))  ≥ [1 – Pr(g(m))][u(l,  l) + δ
CVC] + 
Pr(g(m))[u(l, h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δ
*VC] ≥ [1 – Pr(l)][u(l, l) + δ
CVC] + Pr(l)[u(l, h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δ
 VC], 
where the last inequality comes from  g(m) ≤ l and [u(l, l) + δ
CVC] ≥ [u(l, h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δ
 VC], and 
the first inequality comes from the fact that [1 – Pr(g(m))][u(l, l) + δ
CVC] + Pr(g(m))[u(l, h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  
+ δVC] represents a discounted expected payoff of playing a potentially suboptimal strategy of setting τ 
= l with τ−1 = g(m).  From ICP, VC = [1 – Pr(l)][u(l, l) + δ
CVC] + Pr(l)[u(l, h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δVC], 
which implies that VC ≤ V(g(m)), thus a contradiction.  Therefore, u(g(m), l) + δ
CV(g(m)) > u(g(m), h) + 
(δ
C – δ)VN  + δVC  if g(m) ≤ l. 
Now, I will show that u(g(m), l) + δ
CV(g(m)) >  u(g(m), h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δVC  if g(m) > l.  Define 
K ≡ u(g(m), h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δVC.  Then, V(g(m)) ≥ [1 – Pr(g(m))]u(g(m), l)/{1 – δ
C[1 – Pr(g(m))]} +  
Pr(g(m))K/{1 – δ
C[1 – Pr(g(m))]} because the right-hand side of the inequality represents a discounted 
expected payoff from playing a potentially suboptimal strategy of setting the current and all the future 
protection level at g(m) with τ−1 = g(m).  This implies that u(g(m), l) + δ
CV(g(m)) – K ≥ u(g(m), l) + δ
C[1 
–  Pr(g(m))]u(g(m),  l)/{1 – δ
C[1 – Pr(g(m))]} + δ
CPr(g(m))K/{1 – δ
C[1 – Pr(g(m))]} – K = (1 – 
δ
C){u(g(m), l)/(1 – δ
C) – [u(g(m), h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δVC]}/{1 – δ
C[1 – Pr(g(m))]}.  Note that the last 
term has a positive sign because u(g(m), l)/(1 – δ
C) > [u(g(m), h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δVC] with u(g(m), l)/(1 
– δ
C) > VC  as g(m) > l.  This implies that u(g(m), l) + δ
CV(g(m)) > K.  
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For Lemma 3 (b): 
To prove that G(τ−1) is strictly increasing in τ−1, I first show that   ≥   for all   >   ∈ [0, h] 
with  ∈ G( ) and  ∈ G( ).  Then, I show that   =   will lead to a contradiction using a result 
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C[1 – Pr( )]V( ) 
because the terms of the right-hand sides of these inequalities represent discounted expected payoffs 































1 − τ τ ) – F( ,
//
1 − τ τ ).  According to the mean value theorem (using the fact that 
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1 − τ τ ] = [∂u(τ , l)/∂τ  – ∂u(τ , l)/∂τ ] = 0 
as  ∂
2u(τ , )/∂







C[Pr( )–Pr( )][V( )–V( )] > 0 because Pr( )–Pr( )) > 0 and [V( )–V( )] > 0 from 













C[Pr( )–Pr( )][V( )–V( )] ≤ 0 in (A3), thus   ≥   for all   

















τ ) is differentiable for τ  ∈ G(τ−1) for all τ−1 ∈ [0, h].  Therefore, 
(A4)     
. 0 ] / ) ( )][ ( 1 [ / ) , (
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= ∂ ∂ − + ∂ ∂
− −
− −
τ τ τ δ τ τ τ





If  = ,   from  (A4), 
contradicting  ,  , and  .  
// τ








1 τ τ τ τ δ τ τ τ τ τ τ ∂ ∂ − − = ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − − − − V Pr Pr F F
C








1 > − − − τ τ Pr Pr 0 / ) (
/ > ∂ ∂ τ τ V
 
Proof for Lemma 4 
  55For Lemma 4 (a): 
In proving Lemma 4 (a), I use Theorem 4 in Cotter and Park (2006).  According to the theorem, if 
there exists a unique τS  ∈ (0, h) that satisfies IC defined in (11): ∂F(τS,  τS)/∂τ  + δ
C[1  − 
Pr(τS)][∂V(τS)/∂τ] = 0  and τ ∈ (0, h) for every  1 − τ  ∈ [0, h] and τ  ∈ G( 1 − τ ), then G(τS) = {τS} and τS  is 
a strongly stable protection level in the sense that for every  1 − τ  > τS and  τ  ∈ G( 1 − τ ),τ  <  1 − τ , and for 
every  1 − τ  < τS and τ  ∈ G( 1 − τ ), τ  >  1 − τ .  To prove Lemma 4 (a), therefore, I first show that there exists 
a unique τS ∈ (0, h) such that ∂F(τS, τS)/∂τ  + δ
C[1 − Pr(τS)][∂V(τS)/∂τ] = 0 if [∂
2Pr(τ)/(∂τ)
2][1 – Pr(τ)] – 
{1 + δ
C[1 – Pr(τ)]}[∂Pr(τ)/∂τ ]
2 > 0 for all τ ∈ [0, h] and ∂Pr(τ)/∂τ ≈ 0 at τ = 0, then establish that τ ∈ 
(0, h) for every  1 − τ  ∈ [0, h] and τ  ∈ G( 1 − τ ). 
First note that ∂F(τS, τS)/∂τ  = ∂u(τS, l)/∂τ > 0 at τS = 0 and ∂
2F(τS, τS)/∂τ
2 < 0 with ∂F(τS, τS)/∂τ  = 
∂u(τS, l)/∂τ = 0 at τS = h from the assumptions on the derivatives of u(τ, τ) w.r.t. τ .  Because ∂V(τS)/∂τ  
= – [∂Pr(τS)/∂τ ]{u(τS, l) + δ
CV(τS) – [u(τS, h) + (δ
C – δ )VN  + δVC]} ≈ 0 at τS = 0 from the assumption of 
∂Pr(τ)/∂τ ≈ 0 at τ = 0,  F(τS, τS)/∂τ  > 0 at τS = 0 implies that IC in (11) will not be satisfied at τS = 0.  
Now, define A(τS) ≡ u(τS, l) + δ
CV(τS) – [u(τS, h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δVC] and B(τS) ≡ δ
C[1 − Pr(τS)] 
[∂Pr(τS)/∂τ]A(τS), thus δ




Pr(τ)] – {1 + δ
C[1 – Pr(τ)]}[∂Pr(τ)/∂τ ]
2〉 > 0 for all τS ∈ [0, h]  because [∂
2Pr(τ)/(∂τ)
2][1 – Pr(τ)] – {1 
+ δ
C[1 – Pr(τ)]}[∂Pr(τ)/∂τ ]
2 > 0  for all τS ∈ [0, h] by assumption and A(τS) > 0 as shown in the proof 
for Lemma 3 (a).  This implies that there exists a unique τS ∈ (0, h) such that ∂F(τS, τS)/∂τ  + δ
C[1 − 
Pr(τS)][∂V(τS)/∂τ] = 0. 
Now, I only need to prove that τ  ∈ (0, h) for every  1 − τ  ∈ [0, h] and τ  ∈ G( 1 − τ ).  Because G( 1 − τ ) 
is strictly increasing in  1 − τ  as proved in Lemma 3 (b), it suffices to prove that 0 ∉ G(0) and h ∉ G(h).    
Note that 0 ∉ G(0) is already proven above: “IC in (11) will not be satisfied at τS = 0.” Because IC in 
(11) is a necessary condition for any stationary protection level, IC in (11) being not satisfied at τS = 0 
implies that 0 ∉ G(0).      
I can show that h ∉ G(h) by contradiction.  First, assume that h = G(h), implying that V(h) = 


























d C F Pr τ τ τ δ
∞
= = 0 } { d d h τ
0 = h, τ1 = h − ε, and  , which defines a corresponding discounted expected payoff, 
denoted by V
∞
= = 2 } { d d h τ
A(h).  Then, I can show that VA(h) – V(h) = {Pr(h)u(h − ε, h) + [1 – Pr(h)]u(h − ε, l) + 
Pr(h)[(δ
C – δ)
 VN  + δVC]} − {Pr(h)u(h, h) + [1 – Pr(h)]u(h, l) + Pr(h)[(δ
C – δ)
 VN  + δVC]} + δ
C[1 – 
Pr(h)][Pr(h − ε) − Pr(h)]{u(h, h) – u(h, l) + [(δ
C – δ)
 VN  + δVC]} − δ
C[Pr(h) − Pr(h − ε)]F(h, h)δ
C[1 − 
  56Pr(h)]/{1 − δ
C[1 − Pr(h)]}.   ) 0 /( )] ( ) ( [
0 − −
→ ε
ε h V h V lim A  = −δ
C[∂Pr(h)/∂τ][1 – Pr(h)]{(1 −δ
C)[u(h, h) + (δ
C 
– δ)VN  + δVC] − u(h, l)}/{1 − δ
C[1 − Pr(h)]}> 0 where the last inequality comes from ∂Pr(h)/∂τ > 0 and 
u(h, l)/(1 −δ
C) > u(h, h) + (δ
C – δ)VN  + δVC  as shown in Lemma 3 (a).  This implies that h ∉ G(h). 
 
For Lemma 4 (b): 
To prove Lemma 4 (b), I will show that H cannot strictly increase its discounted payoff by initiating 
a punishment phase in a period that that follows a cooperative period during which H set its protection 
level at   ≠ l = τ
/ l S, as long as the lengths of punishment phases satisfy the necessary conditions in 
Lemma 1 (a).  Once I prove this result, this implies that H cannot increase its discounted expected 
payoff by initiating a punishment phase along any (deviatory) protection sequence, thus Lemma 4 (b).   
Suppose that H sets its protection level at l in a period that follows a cooperative period during 
which H sets its protection level at   ≠ l = τ
/ l S, then chooses its optimal protection sequence from the 
next period on.  Denote the discounted expected payoff from taking this potentially suboptimal action 
by C( ), then 
/ l





C V l l u l Pr V V h l u l Pr l C δ δ δ δ + − + + − + =
Now suppose that H initiates a tariff war phase by setting tariff level at h in a period that follows a 
cooperative period where H set its protection level   ≠ l = τ
/ l S, then follows its specified strategy once 
the tariff war phase is over.  Denote the discounted expected payoff from taking this potentially 
suboptimal action by D( ), then 
/ l
(A6)   
]. ) ( ) , ( )][ ( 1 [              









V V l h u l Pr
V V h h u l Pr l D
δ δ δ
δ δ δ
+ − + −
+ + − + =
I can rewrite C( ) and D( ) into 
/ l
/ l
(A7)       
)]. )( ( ) , ( ) , ( )[ ( ) ( ) , ( ) (











V V h h u l h u l Pr V V l h u l D
V V h l u l l u l Pr V l l u l C
− − + − − + − + =
− − + − − + =
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
Now, note that C( ) − D( ) =  [u(l, l) − u(h, l)] + ( )(V
/ l
/ l δ δ −
C
C − VN) − Pr( ){[u(l, l) − u(l, h)] − [u(h, 
l) − u(h, h)] +[(δ
/ l
C – δ) − (δ – δ
S)](VC  − VN)} = 0 from [u(l, l) − u(l, h)] = [u(h, l) − u(h, h)] and the 
sufficient condition for ICP and ICP
* in Lemma 1 (a):  = [u(h, l) − u(l, l)]/(V δ δ −
C
C − VN)  and   
= 
S C δ δ +
) ( δ δ + .  Because C( ) is equal or possibly lower than a discounted expected payoff from choosing 
an optimal protection sequence of not involving an initiation of a punishment phase, this implies that H 
cannot strictly increase its discounted payoff by initiating a punishment phase in a period that follows a 
cooperative period during which H sets its protection level at   ≠ l = τ
/ l
/ l S. 
 
  57Proof for Proposition 1 
With δ = δ
C − [u(h,  ) − u( , )]/(V S l S l S l C − VN), and  , note that setting τ ) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
S =   
satisfies IC in (11), thus   is the unique stationary protection level from which H does not have any 
incentive to deviate from, as described in Lemma 4.  By symmetry,   is also such a protection level for 
F.  If l =  , then PTS satisfy ICP and   as well as IC, thus becoming a supergame 
equilibrium of the protection setting game between H and F from which no country has any unilateral 




S l ) ( 2 δ δ δ δ − = −
C S C
What is the relationship between the condition for Lemma 4 (a) and the existence of l (< h) that 
satisfies I(l) = 0 in (13)?  For example, does the condition for Lemma 4 (a) guarantee the existence of 
such l?  To address this issue, I show that the second term of I(l) in (13), δ
C[∂Pr(l)/∂τ ][1 − Pr(l)][u(h, l) 
– u(l, h)], representing H’s dynamic incentive to avoid a punishment phase, may not necessarily increase 
in l when the condition for Lemma 4(a) is satisfied.  ∂{[∂Pr(l)/∂l][1 − Pr(l)][u(h, l) – u(l, h)]}/∂l = 
〈[∂
2Pr(l)/(∂l)
2][1 – Pr(l)] – [∂Pr(l)/∂l]
2〉[u(h, l) – u(l, h)] + [∂Pr(l)/∂l][1 − Pr(l)]{∂[u(h, l) – u(l, h)]/∂l} = 
〈[∂
2Pr(l)/(∂l)
2][1 – Pr(l)] – {1 + δ
C[1 – Pr(l)]}[∂Pr(l)/∂l]
2〉[u(h,  l) – u(l,  h)] + 〈{δ
C[1 – Pr(l)]} 
[∂Pr(l)/∂l]
2[u(h, l) – u(l, h)] + [∂Pr(l)/∂l][1 − Pr(l)]{∂[u(h, l) – u(l, h)]/∂l}〉.  Because [∂Pr(l)/∂l][1− 
Pr(l)]{∂[u(h,  l) – u(l,  h)]/∂l} < 0, once cannot rule out the possibility of having {δ
C[1 – 
Pr(l)]}[∂Pr(l)/∂l]
2[u(h,  l) – u(l,  h)] + [∂Pr(l)/∂l][1  −  Pr(l)]{∂[u(h,  l) – u(l,  h)]/∂l} < 0, thus   
∂{[∂Pr(l)/∂l][1 − Pr(l)][u(h, l) – u(l, h)]}/∂l  < 0 even when [∂
2Pr(l)/(∂l)
2][1 – Pr(l)] –{1 + δ
C[1 – 
Pr(l)]}[∂Pr(l)/∂l]
2 > 0.  Therefore, the condition for Lemma 4 (a) does not necessarily guarantee the 
existence of l
 (< h) that satisfies I(l) = 0, validating the insertion of an additional condition to guarantee 
the existence of such l in Proposition 1. 
 
Proof for Proposition 4 
For (a):  It is sufficient to show that dVC
W/dT
W in (22) is less than 0 for all values of T
W ≥ 1 if Pr(l) 
< Pr .  Using 
(A8)      []
)], , ( ) , ( )][ ( 2 1 [
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I can rewrite dVC
W/dT
W in (22) into 
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D = 0.  Using 
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By replacing u(l, l) − u(l, h) with u(l, l) − u(h, h) in the above expression and using u(l, l) − u(l, h) > u(l, 
l) − u(h, h), I obtain the first inequality in the following expressions:    
[]
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where   and setting   for the 
last bracketed term,   in the preceding expression 
to the second inequality are used to obtain the second inequality.  To obtain the (last) equality in the 
0 / )]} ( 2 1 /[ )] )( 1 ( 1 {[ < ∂ − + − − + + − ∂
W T C C C T C C C T Pr
W W
δ δ δ δ δ δ ∞ →
W T
)] ( 2 1 /[ )] )( 1 ( 1 [
W W T C C C T C C C Pr δ δ δ δ δ δ − + − − + + −
  59above expressions, I use the assumption of ∂
2Pr(l)/∂(ω
D)
2 = 0, thus Pr(l) being linear in ω
D.  With this 
assumption, I can rewrite Pr(l) = ω
DPr










D(l)/∂l].  Once I 
rewrite the corresponding terms in the expression preceding to the last equality in this way, I can obtain 
the last expression (or equivalently, the last equality).  As a result of these transformations, I obtain the 
following inequalities: 


































with the last inequality holding for all values of T
W ≥ 1 if  < 0, 
which in turn holds if Pr(l) < 
) 1 )( 1 2 ( 2 ) 1 )( 1 (
C C Pr Pr Pr δ δ + − + + −
Pr .  
 For (b):  It is sufficient to show that dVC
W/dT
W in (22) is greater than 0 for all values of T
W ≥ 1 if 
Pr(l) > Pr .  As shown above, I can rewrite dVC
W/dT
W (22) into the following expression, using (A8):  
.
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By replacing u(l, l) − u(h, h) with u(l, l) − u(l, h) in the above expression and using u(l, l) − u(l, h) > u(l, 
l) − u(h, h), I obtain the first inequality in the following expressions    
,
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where    for the last bracketed term in the  1 )] ( 2 1 /[ )] )( 1 ( 1 [ < − + − − + + −
W W T C C C T C C C Pr δ δ δ δ δ δ
  60preceding expression to the second inequality is used to obtain the second inequality.  To obtain the 
(last) equality in the above expressions, once again I use the assumption of ∂
2Pr(l)/∂(ω
D)
2 = 0 in the 
same manner that I used it to obtain the last equality in the corresponding expressions in the proof for 
Proposition 4 (a).  As a result of these transformations, I obtain the following inequalities: 
(A10)   0 ) 1 2 ( 2
) , ( ) , (
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with the last inequality holding for all values of T
W ≥ 1 if (1 − Pr)[u(l, l) − u(h, h)]/[u(l, l) − u(l, h)] + 
2(2Pr − 1) > 0, which in turn holds if Pr(l) >  Pr .   
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Figure 1. The Effect of a Higher τ −1 on the Optimal Choice of τ   
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Figure 3. Multiple l satisfying I(l) = 0   
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Figure 4. A numerical analysis of the optimal TTS for different values of ρ (rho) with χ = 1, 
α1 − α1
* = 3, β + B = 1 (so, h = 1), and δ
C = 0.5 
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Figure 5. A numerical analysis of the optimal TTS and optimal PTS for different values of 
ρ (rho) with χ = 100, α1 − α1
* = 3, β + B = 1 (so, h = 1), and δ
C = 0.5 
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